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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the development of probabilistic risk assessment for 
substation earthing systems. A number of key parameters have been studied in detail 
which led to the development of a new approach that incorporates the recommendations 
of applicable standards and uses historical system fault data to take account of the 
probabilistic nature of load, protection systems and grid characteristics.
In this work, an in-depth appraisal of existing standards has led to the development of 
safety-limit surfaces that can be used to quantify the benefits/disadvantages of particular 
earthing standards. The investigation has revealed that there are substantial differences 
between the recommended values of tolerable voltages attributed to a combination of 
factors: (i) difference in assumed tolerable body current; (ii) differences in the 
parameters of the electrocution circuit; (iii) differences in the predicted touch voltage; 
and (iv) differences in the assumed worst-case shock location.
The electricity industry, like other industries, is looking to reduce risk to minimum 
feasible while maintaining costs of mitigation within acceptable limits. Therefore, a 
more rigorous and comprehensive procedure of probabilistic risk assessment of the 
earthing systems is required. In order to achieve this, a detailed analysis of all 
parameters was undertaken in this work using more representative accidental circuits 
and parameters extracted from historical system fault data, provided by the 
collaborating transmission companies. These parameters were modelled and integrated 
into the proposed probabilistic risk assessment process.
Work within this investigation on improving accuracy of calculation of heart fibrillation 
has led to the development of a probability surface of ventricular fibrillation and a 
computerised process that determines an accurate probability for a given body current 
and shock duration. This procedure takes into consideration the body current path and 
eliminates reading errors or assumptions that could result into conservative or optimistic 
conclusions.
The above fundamental investigations on parameters affecting the overall risk were 
implemented in a new computerised risk assessment procedure CRAFTS suitable for 
transmission systems. CRAFTS allows a probabilistic risk assessment of the system 
under investigation. The application integrates the recent developments in the latest 
standard IEC 60479-1 and the developed probability surface of ventricular fibrillation. 
A case study performed on a typical grid has shown that the developed program is very 
useful when applying sensitivity analysis of the various parameters of the system and 
accidental circuit.
The proposed full probabilistic risk assessment method incorporates the earthing system 
simulation results performed by specialised software, namely CDEGS, making it 
possible to simulate different electrocution scenarios throughout the substation instead 
of assuming a ‘worst case scenario’ and exposure to maximum possible voltages. 
Overall, the research in this thesis, offers an integrated solution of probabilistic risk 
assessment of earthing systems in aid of sound cost/benefit analysis and decision 
making.
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BS British Standard
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cdf Cumultive Distribution Function
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Standardization
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid advances in technology and the fast pacing development of the industrial 
world, there has been a huge increase in the number and size of large plants operating in 
various areas of engineering. As these plants increased in complexity and working force 
so did the public awareness of the risks associated with their operation.
Especially after key accidents such as Flixborough, Bhopal, Chernobyl and Piper Alpha, 
there has been an ever increasing need to minimise the risks associated with the 
operation of such plants while at the same time maximising the beneficial results of 
modem technology [1.1]. However, due to the hazardous nature of many processes, it 
is infeasible to eliminate risks totally. A balance, that would secure the benefits gained 
by the practice of the hazardous activity, while retaining the risk to acceptable levels, is 
desirable. As a result, government regulators have provided frameworks for industry, 
so that employers can assess the levels of risk of their operations and determine their 
acceptability.
The power industry is no exception to the rule. As in all industries, employees may be 
subject to different types of accidents ranging from trips and falls to fires and 
explosions. Also, due to the high operating voltages of the transmission and distribution 
systems, death from electrocution has always been a primary concern within the 
industry.
The 400/275 kV transmission system operated by National Grid consists of over 250 
substations interconnected by 15000 km of overhead lines supported by more than
26,000 transmission towers. Another 500 km of underground cables are added creating 
a huge network. [1.2, 1.3]. According to National Grid, about 200 faults take place on 
their transmission system every year, of which 90% are classified as earth faults [1.2,
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1.4]. Moreover, only 25% to 50% of these faults will result in significant current flow in 
the substation earth mat [1.5]. However, during these faults, the current magnitudes can 
range from 4 kA to 35 kA, depending on the level of generation, the system 
configuration and the type and location of the fault [1.6].
The distribution system, operating at voltages from 132 kV down to 6 kV, is far bigger 
compared to the transmission system. The total length of overhead line system is
180.000 km while the underground cables are approximately 133,000 km. There are 
about 5,000 substations operating in the range 132 kV down to 20 kV, and another
170.000 substations distributing power to the low voltage system [1.2, 1.7]. The 
distribution system because of its extent and greater susceptibility to short circuit 
events, suffers far more faults than the transmission system. The total number of faults 
occurring per annum are estimated to be 25,000, of which 70% involve connection to 
the earth [1.2, 1.8, 1.9]. Although the fault current magnitudes are lower than those on 
the transmission system, typically, ranging from 25 kA at 132 kV substations to 1-2 kA 
at 33/11 kV substations, the fault clearance times are much longer. While the main 
protection in the transmission system will usually clear a fault within the first 160 ms, in 
the distribution system, the fault clearance time may exceed 1 s [1.2].
When a proportion of the earth fault current flows through the earth path, as opposed to 
the earth wire, there will be a rise of potential of the earthing system with respect to 
remote earth. The generated potential differences across points at different locations 
inside or outside an installation (e.g. a substation), when bridged by humans may result 
in electrocution. Depending on the accidental circuit, these potential differences can be 
either touch, step or transferred voltages. [1.2,1.10]
If the magnitude of these voltages and shock duration are high enough, it can result in 
severe bums, asphyxia or even heart fibrillation and death. Because of legal constraints,
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it is not easy to acquire statistical data and detailed accident description of deaths that 
occur. However, anecdotal evidence from electrical engineers reveals that regardless of 
the great advances in fault clearance times and earthing practice enforced by regulations 
and relevant standards, there is still a toll of human lives.
Over the past few years, there has been a vast improvement of the available earthing 
standards where mainly analytical solutions are provided to calculate the magnitude of 
the hazardous voltages and make an assessment of safety in any installation.
Since the magnitude of the step and touch voltages in a substation will depend on the 
location of the person, the shock scenario and the magnitude of fault current, it is 
common practice in various standards to make an assessment based on the maximum 
possible touch and step voltages and shock duration [1.2, 1.11-1.15]. However studies 
have shown that, due to different assumptions used for calculating the various 
parameters of a given earthing grid as well as the different accepted levels of allowable 
body current, there are substantial differences between the recommended values of 
tolerable voltages and, consequently, of the safety-limits that are applicable to an earth 
grid. The studies carried out by the author and other investigators [1.16-1.19] have 
established that the standards recommendations do not compare very well, resulting in 
either over-designing of the earthing system or, on the other hand, a compromise in 
safety.
1.1 Contributions of Present Work
During the course of the research programme the following contributions were 
achieved.
• Extensive survey of safety requirements to include government and private 
companies’ practices and recommendations.
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• Appraisal and comparison of national and international standards and their 
recommendations for calculation of safety voltages. The main differences are 
discussed and best practices are highlighted.
• Extension of the range of usability of IEC safety curves for allowable body 
current and body impedance through derivation of empirical equations and 
surface probabilities.
• Novel analysis of system fault data and its impact on risk assessment of earthing 
systems.
• Development of a new software program called Cardiff Risk Assessment 
Facility for Transmission Systems or “CRAFTS” to perform risk assessment of 
earthing systems in compliance with recommendations of national and 
international standards to allow engineers and asset managers to make informed 
decisions on earthing systems safety and mitigation of hazards on electricity 
networks.
• Development of advanced statistical and probabilistic procedure for the risk 
assessment of earthing systems.
1.2 Thesis Content
Over the past few years, the electrical industry worldwide has started recognising the 
probabilistic nature of the exposure to earth potential rise and of the effect of current on 
the human body. The internationally widely adopted standard IEC 479-1 [1.20], based 
on animal experiments, has provided curves of allowable body current against shock 
duration of different probability levels. Also, the body impedance was given as a 
function of the touch voltage for different confidence levels. Moreover, fault location, 
fault current magnitude, clearance time, soil resistivity, location of the person in time of 
shock as well as the current path are some of the parameters that show a statistical
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variation and can be included in the assessment process as such instead of single or 
“worst case scenario” values.
It is shown that a standard may have safety and/or cost implications compared with the 
alternative standards, and harmonisation of earthing systems design standards require 
the inclusion of probabilistic parameters that may lead to a less subjective approach to 
design. Therefore, the contents of this thesis are summarised to:
• The development of safety-limit surfaces for various earthing standards. 
(Chapter 3)
• The development of probabilistic safety criteria based on the IEC 479-1 curves 
that can be integrated in the already applied risk assessment processes and also 
to a fully probabilistic method. (Chapter 4)
• The investigation of each of the various parameters that reflect the probabilistic 
nature of load, protection system and grid characteristics and their modelling 
based on historical data provided by the cooperating transmission company 
(National Grid). (Chapter 5)
• The implementation of the process, to a stand-alone software package 
“CRAFTS”. (Chapter 6)
• A novel approach to probabilistic risk assessment of electrical substations based 
on the developed criteria that takes into consideration the probabilistic nature of 
all the contributing parameters. (Chapter 7)
• A case study where the suggested methodology is applied to an existing 
substation. (Chapter 7)
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CHAPTER 2. RISK ASSESSMENT: A REVIEW
The term risk appeared in the English language in the 17th century and, etymologically, 
it comes from the Italian “risco ” or “rischio ” which means danger. It is derived from 
the Latin word “risicare ” which actually means navigating a ship close to dangerous 
cliffs, and it is believed that the word originates from the Greek word “riza” which 
means both root and cliff [2.1].
2.1 Introduction
As mentioned before, reassuring safety and, therefore, assessing risk in any work 
environment has become a major issue in modem industry. Various approaches towards 
risk evaluation and quantification have been developed, and the ultimate purpose of this 
thesis is to contribute towards developing a comprehensive process of probabilistic risk 
assessment of power systems. Initially though, it is essential to investigate the 
regulatory framework upon which any risk assessment is based. It is important to 
comprehend what is expected from the risk assessment process, which are the 
fundamental principles that should be followed and the targets to be achieved. 
Therefore, the first part of this chapter reviews the relevant legislation that covers this 
area as well as to the general approaches to risk assessment.
Then, the focus is turned to risk assessment of power systems. In particular, the effects 
of current on the human body including electrocution hazards that exist from the high 
voltage installations are described.
In the next section, we examine the available approaches of risk assessment of power 
systems as well as the common practice that is followed in the UK in particular. The 
tolerability of risk is also discussed and how the acceptable levels of risk are defined in 
order to make justified decisions and determine the appropriate action. Finally, the
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different approaches for risk mitigation are listed and then followed by a brief 
discussion of their effect.
2.2 Health & Safety Legislative Framework
The initial piece of legislation covering Occupational Health and Safety in Great Britain 
is the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, also referred to as HASAW or HSW [2.2], 
and later on, in 1978, the Health and Safety Work (Northern Ireland) Order for Northern 
Ireland was also released [2.3].
According to the legislation, there are five separate classes of persons that general duties 
apply to:
• Employers
• Employees
• Manufacturers and suppliers of industrial products
• The self-employed
• Occupiers of buildings in which persons work, other than one’s own employees 
The main duty of an employer is to ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of all 
his employees, as far as it is reasonably practicable [2.4]. The HSW act outlines in more 
detail the duties of employers and aims to:
1. Provide and maintain the plant or any system of work, safe and without any 
risks.
2. Make the necessary arrangements to ensure the safety and the absence of health 
risks when using, handling, storing and transporting articles and equipment.
3. When necessary, provide information, instruction, training and supervision in 
order to maintain safety.
4. Maintain safety in all places of work under the employer’s control including 
entrance and egress.
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5. Finally, provide adequate facilities and arrangements for employees’ welfare. 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR) [2.5], initially 
published in 1992 and later revised in 1999, is the most significant regulation in current 
health and safety legislation [2.4] where Regulation 3 on “Risk Assessment” states that: 
Every employer shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment of:
1. The risks to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed 
whilst at work.
2. The risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of 
or in connection with the conduct by him or his undertaking [2.5].
The responsibility of employers to undertake a “suitable and sufficient risk assessment” 
is regarded as the cornerstone of all modem protective legislation [2.4]. In a nutshell, 
under these principal legal requirements, employers are responsible for ensuring the 
safety and health of their employees and also the public if they are at risk from their 
working activities.
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) published “Reducing risks, protecting people” 
initially in 1999 and later a revision in 2001; a document [2.6] which discusses the 
overall framework for decision making in order to “ensure consistency and coherence 
across the full range of risks” under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (MHSWR) 
[2.6, 2.7]. The developments that influenced the decision making approach, the 
principles behind the tolerability limits of risks and also the role of risk assessment are 
discussed. Risk assessment is described as a “tool necessary to inform our decisions by 
helping us to understand further the nature and degree of risk and extrapolating, from 
available data, our experience of harm, or for representing a large amount of scientific 
information and judgment as an estimate of the risks” [2.6]. This statement has been the 
basis for the development of rigorous and analytical risk assessment procedures and
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shows the way towards quantification of risk. In the following section the main 
principles of risk assessment are outlined together with a list of some important 
definitions.
2.3 Risk Assessment
According to the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR)
[2.5], all employers and self-employed people are required to assess the risks to anyone 
who might be affected from work activities, including members of the public. The risk 
assessment process consists basically of identifying the possible hazards and evaluating 
the extent of the risk taking into consideration all safety controls already in place. If risk 
levels are unacceptable, further measures are implemented and the system is reassessed 
to confirm compliance with regulations [2.4, 2.8].
2.3.1 Definitions
The Approved Code of Practice (ACOP) [2.8], a document, that accompanies 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR) [2.5], provides the 
following definitions:
a) A hazard is something with the potential to cause harm (this can include 
substances or machines, methods of work and other aspects of work 
organisation).
b) Risk expresses the likelihood that the harm from a particular hazard is realised.
c) The extent of the risk covers the population which might be affected by a risk,
i.e. the number of people who might be exposed and the consequences for them.
Therefore, risk refers not only to the likelihood that the harm will occur but also to the 
consequences [2.4].
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Across health and safety bibliography, there are various definitions of risk assessment 
but the one accepted by the HSE is:
“Risk assessment is a multi-stage process used to determine the magnitude of a threat 
(risk) of loss, in its widest sense, to assist management decision making. An assessment 
should determine whether the risk is tolerable, taking into account existing control
measures. If they are not adequate, the assessment should recommend more effective
measures. Monitoring of these controls must take place” [2.9].
2.3.2 The Risk Assessment Process
To provide assistance to risk assessors, the HSE has also published a guide called “Five 
Steps to Risk Assessment” [2.10] which provides an outline of the risk assessment, and 
summarizes the process in the following simple steps.
1. Identify the hazards.
2. Decide who might be harmed and how.
3. Evaluate the risks and decide on precaution.
4. Record findings and implement them.
5. Review assessment and update if necessary.
This iterative process is described in further detail in the latest version of the British 
Standard BS 8800 which is a guide to occupational health and safety management 
systems. This publication offers guidance and recommendations on risk management 
issues. It shares common management system principles with the BS EN ISO 9000 on 
“Quality Management” [2.11] and is consistent with the aforementioned HSE 
publication on “The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999”.
[2.5]. The guide provides a detailed description of the risk assessment process, and it is 
presented here in Figure 2.1.
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1 r
Estimate Risk
Identify Hazards
Determine the tolerability of risks
Classify Work Activities
Identify Risk Controls
Prepare Risk Control Action Plan to improve 
risk controls as necessary
Review adequacy of Action Plan-confirm 
whether risks are now acceptable or tolerable
Ensure risk assessment and controls are 
effective and up-to date
Figure 2.1: The process of risk assessment and control [2.11].
The classification of work activities is the initial stage of the process where all “rational 
and manageable” work activities should be included. It is essential to include apart from 
everyday activities, those infrequent tasks such as maintenance work or probable 
emergencies that may occur. These activities can be classified for example as:
• Activities that take place inside but also outside the premises under 
investigation.
• Tasks that are part of the everyday production process.
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• Planned and reactive work.
• Phases of lifecycle of work equipment e.g. installation, normal operation, 
maintenance, repair etc.
• Tasks carried out by contractors.
Then, for each activity, information needs to be gathered concerning the nature of the 
task, the duration and frequency, the location, the number of people involved etc. It is 
necessary at this stage to identify if certain activities need to be assessed separately in 
order to ensure that all the parameters of the particular task are covered and assessed 
appropriately.
The second stage of the process deals with identifying the hazards. At this point, all 
possible sources need to be identified, and also who the stakeholders are and under what 
circumstances that hazard can materialize. Hazards of low harm potential do not need to 
be included in the process. In order to accommodate the identification of hazards, they 
are briefly classified as:
• Physical hazards where sources of electricity are included
• Chemical hazards
• Biological hazards
• Psychological hazards
At this point, it is necessary to identify whether the hazards could affect the public or 
perhaps the surrounding neighbourhood.
The next key step of the process is identifying the risk controls that may already be in 
place to mitigate the hazard or evaluating the effect of proposed possible measures.
The next phase of the process, that perhaps is the most difficult to deal with, is 
determining the risk. The risk of each hazard needs to be addressed with the appropriate 
qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative process that will be discussed later on.
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Apart from the likelihood of a hazard materializing, its impact is also assessed and the 
consequences that it may bear. It is suggested that it may be useful at this stage to 
determine the risk also without taking into consideration the already applied risk 
controls. Such an approach assists in identifying the importance of the measures taken 
so far and may prevent from substituting or even cancelling controls with high 
mitigating impact.
Determining the tolerability of the risks is the process where it is decided whether a risk 
is acceptable or not and if legal requirements are met. Depending on the approach used 
to assess the risk, the results may be compared against different criteria.
The HSE document [2.6] that provides the framework of risk assessment also includes a 
valuable discussion on the principles behind the tolerability limits of risks. As will be 
seen in Section 2.7, these limits have been quantified and can be used to compare 
calculated risks and assist with the decision making process.
The next two steps deal with preparing an action plan to control all of the undesired 
risks which is then followed by a review of the adequacy of the action plan. Here, the 
risks are re-assessed taking into consideration the suggested mitigating measures, and 
then it is considered whether the risk is tolerable or acceptable by comparing against the 
appropriate criteria. If the results are not satisfactory, the process is repeated by re- 
estimating the risk and further action taken till the risk falls within the desired level. 
Finally, it is essential to keep reviewing the system on a regular basis seeking changes 
that may cause risk to increase and act accordingly to maintain safety [2.11].
2.3.3 Qualitative Risk Assessment
Qualitative methods are usually adopted not only for the assessment of an operating 
system but also in the early stages of design and installation when decision making is 
necessary for the selection of equipment and final system configuration. Through these
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studies, all the potential hazards occurring either from equipment or from operating 
procedures that can critically affect safety are identified and ranked. These methods can 
lead to significant risk mitigation but also can provide valuable input to quantitative 
studies. A few of the methods, which find great use in industry and plant studies, are 
Hazard Identification Analysis (HAZID), Checklists or “What i f ’ method, Hazard and 
Operability method (HAZOP) and Preliminarily Hazard Analysis (PHA) [2.12]. A 
detailed discussion of the benefits and utility of different techniques of risk assessment 
employed by the industry can be found in previous project work of the author [2.13]. 
Qualitative answers are often sufficient for making good decisions about the allocation 
of resources for safety improvements. However, as managers seek quantitative 
cost/benefit information upon which to base their decisions, they are increasingly 
turning their attention to the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).
2.3.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), also called Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) or 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA), is the process that aims to quantify the risk that is 
caused by high technology installations.
Many sectors worldwide employ quantitative risk assessment methods, including 
transport, construction, energy, chemical processing, aerospace, the military, and even 
to project planning and financial management. In many of these areas of industry, PRA 
techniques have become essential to the decision making. Especially because of the 
benefit that PRA allows in categorising and assessing risks with enough precision to 
enable consistent application by different assessors at different times, quantitative 
techniques in several sectors have been adopted as part of the regulatory framework by 
relevant authorities.
2-9
Generally, even for those areas that PRA is not a standard practice, there is a constant 
increase in the application of these methodologies either for validating claims for safety 
or for providing numerical evidence showing the need for further improvement. [2.12, 
2.14-2.16].
Because of this trend and the wide acceptability of PRA, over the past few years, 
quantitative techniques and tools that apply these techniques have grown in 
sophistication. However, the risk analysis essentially provides answers to the following 
three questions:
• What can happen?
• How likely is it to happen?
• Given that it occurs, what are the consequences?
The identification of the possible hazards, the quantification of the likelihood that the 
hazard materializes and, finally, the severity of the consequences are the parameters that 
define risk [2.14].
For each sector, there is great variation in the goals, size, complexity and techniques of 
probabilistic risk analysis. Descriptions of the various techniques as well as a discussion 
of their applicability in different areas are also included in the author’s previous work 
[2.13]. At this point, risk assessment in power systems is focused on and the main 
practices followed in the sector nowadays as well as the challenges faced by the 
electrical industry will be presented.
2.4 Risk Assessment in Power Systems
Under the current legislation of Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HASAW) 
[2.7] and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR) [2.5], 
transmission and distribution companies must ensure safety for their employees and the 
public. Power plants, as any other type of plant impose various hazards (falls, trips, fire,
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exposure to harmful substances etc), and qualitative and quantitative assessments take 
place to control those risks. Specifically, due to the high voltages operating in these 
systems, electrical safety is a prime concern and is managed independently.
2.4.1 Effects of Current on Human Body
Electrocution of the human body can result in various consequences ranging from bums 
to asphyxia and ventricular fibrillation depending on current magnitude and shock 
duration [2.17]. However, the primary cause of death following electrocution is 
considered to be ventricular fibrillation. Based on animal experiments, this heart 
condition is used to deduce threshold currents for given shock durations or estimate the 
probability of death from an electric shock. Next, follows a more detailed analysis of the 
effects of alternating current as well as a description of the induced heart condition of 
ventricular fibrillation.
2.4.2 Effects of sinusoidal alternating current
The international standard IEC 479-1 [2.17] on “Effects of current on human beings and 
livestock” provides a detailed description on the effects of sinusoidal alternating current 
passing through the human body for frequencies between 15 Hz to 100 Hz as well as the 
various current threshold values of these effects [2.17].
The lowest threshold of current, the threshold of perception is defined as the minimum 
value of touch current which causes any sensation for the person through which it is 
flowing. The magnitude of this body current threshold depends on various parameters, 
such as the body contact area with an electrode, the conditions of contact, and finally 
the physiological characteristics of the individual.
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The threshold of reaction, or else the minimum value of touch current that causes 
involuntary muscular contraction is regarded to be 0.5 mA independent of time and 
depends on the same parameters as before.
Immobilization is the effect of current on muscles or on associated nerves or parts of the 
brain, which causes the human body or part of the human body not to be able to move 
voluntarily. The magnitude of current that can cause immobilization depends on the 
volume of the muscles affected as well as the part of the brain and type of nerves 
affected by the current.
A very important threshold is the value of ‘let-go’ current since it is the maximum value 
of touch current at which a person holding live electrodes can let go of the electrodes. 
The value depends on various parameters such as the contact area, the shape and size of 
the electrodes and also on the physiological parameters of the individual. The threshold 
of let-go current for adult males is typically 10 mA while the value of 5 mA covers the 
whole population [2.17].
2.4.3 Ventricular Fibrillation
The threshold of ventricular fibrillation is the minimum value of current through the 
body which causes ventricular fibrillation. If this threshold is exceeded, it can be fatal 
because the blood flow stops, and no oxygen is being transported to the human body. 
Ventricular fibrillation can occur only if the shock occurs within the heart’s vulnerable 
period. The IEC 479-1 describes the vulnerable period as a comparatively small part of 
the cardiac cycle during which the heart fibres are in an inhomogeneous state of 
excitability and ventricular fibrillation occurs if they are excited by an electric current of 
sufficient magnitude. This period, as shown in Figure 2.2, corresponds to the first part 
of the T-wave in the electrocardiogram and lasts for approximately 10% of the heart 
cycle. Figure 2.3 shows the triggering of ventricular fibrillation when the electric shock
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falls within the vulnerable period [2.17]. Parameters that affect the threshold of 
ventricular fibrillation can be physiological such as anatomy of the body, state. of 
cardiac function, etc.
Heart cycle
Atria
Ventricles
Spread of 
excitation
Recovery from 
excitation
S
Vulnerable period of the ventricles
NOTE The numbers designate the subsequent stages of propagation of the excitation.
Figure 2.2: Occurrence of vulnerable period of ventricles during the cardiac cycle [2.17].
Ventricular fibrillation
ECG
-120
Blood-pressure
o>
- 40
I 400 ms
Figure 23: Triggering of ventricular fibrillation in vulnerable period-Effects on electro-cardiogram 
(ECG) and blood pressure [2.17].
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Figure 2.4 shows zones of allowable body current against shock duration for a current 
path from left hand to both feet based on statistical results from animal experiments and 
human beings. Curve cx was empirically produced to show the current below which 
ventricular fibrillation is unlikely to occur.
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Body current 1%
Figure 2.4: Conventional time/current zones of effects of a.c. current (15 Hz to 100 Hz) on persons 
for current path corresponding to left hand to feet 12.17].
A more detailed description of the time/current zones of the effects of a.c. current on 
persons is presented on Figure 2.5.
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Zones Boundaries Physiological effects
AC-1 Up to 0.5 mA curve a Perception possible but usually no ‘startled’ reaction
AC-2 0.5 mA up to curve b Perception and involuntary muscular contractions likely 
but usually no harmful electrical physiological effects
AC-3 Curve b and above
Strong involuntary muscular contractions. Difficulty in 
breathing. Reversible disturbances of hearth function.
Immobilization may occur. Effects increasing with 
current magnitude. Usually no organic damage to be 
expected
AC-4 Above curve Ci
Patho-physiological effects may occur such as cardiac 
arrest, breathing arrest, and bums or other cellular 
damage. Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing 
with current magnitude and time.
C1 -C 2 Probability of ventricular fibrillation increasing up to 5%
C2 -C 3 Probability of ventricular fibrillation up to about 50%
Beyond curve C3 Probability of ventricular fibrillation above 50%
For durations of current flow below 200 ms, ventricular fibrillation is only initiated within 
the vulnerable period if the relevant thresholds are surpassed.
Figure 2.5: Time/current zones for a.c. 15 Hz to 100 Hz for hand to feet pathway [2.17].
2.4.4 Power Systems and Electrocution Hazards
It is sometimes and wrongly assumed that when a conductor is earthed, then it is safe to 
touch [2.18]. When the insulation of a high voltage conductor to earth fails, the fault 
current, or a part of it, flows through the earth mat and returns to the neutral points of 
the supply transformer. The fault current passes to the substation earth electrode, which 
because of its impedance to the current flow, results in a potential rise of the earth 
electrode and of the earth in the vicinity of the substation [2.19].
Magnitudes of the potential of the earth electrode and of the ground surface of the 
surrounding area depend on the location of fault and the distance from earth electrode 
respectively. The potential is greater at the substation electrode and it reduces with 
distance away from the electrode at the point of the earth fault. [2.18, 2.20].
Therefore, under earth fault conditions, potential differences that occur inside and 
outside of high voltage installations can be hazardous when human bridges these points
[2.21]. There are different electrocution scenarios which may occur depending on where 
the person is standing and the contact conditions with earth conductors.
(i) A touch voltage scenario occurs when a person comes in contact with 
metalwork connected to the earth electrode and picks up a portion of the EPR. It is 
assumed that the current travels through the human body from hand to feet and that the 
horizontal distance of the feet from the exposed part is lm. A slightly different touch 
voltage scenario occurs when a person bridges two points of metalwork of different 
potential allowing current to flow through the human body.
(ii) Step voltage, on the other hand, is the part of the potential rise due to an earth 
fault that can be picked by a person with a step-width of lm, assuming that the current 
is flowing via the human body from foot to foot [2.22]. However, the magnitude of the 
voltages that a person can be exposed to, will vary depending on the conductor that 
he/she comes in contact with or the location where he/she stands. When assessing the 
safety of a high voltage system, it is considered impractical to include all the possible 
touch and step voltage scenarios; That is why under current practice, the risk assessment 
is based upon the maximum touch and step voltages [2.21].
Step voltages are usually considered less hazardous compared to touch voltages. The 
main reason is that the human body, as shown in the latest version of IEC 479-1 [2.17], 
can tolerate higher currents for a path from foot to foot as we will see later on in further 
detail. Moreover, for any given position, the step voltage is lower than the touch voltage 
so when a system is safe for touch scenarios it should also be considered safe for step 
voltage scenarios [2.21]. However, there could be places where there is no touch voltage 
hazard (i.e. no exposed metalwork) but step voltages may be experienced.
2-16
(iii) A scenario of transfer potential occurs when a potential rise of an earthing 
system is transferred by a connected conductor (e.g. rail, pipeline, metallic cable sheath 
or fence) into areas of low or no potential rise relative to reference earth [2.22].
Various standards worldwide have been developed, providing guidelines and limits 
concerning the design and operation of these systems in order to control the hazardous 
voltages. The Electricity at Work Regulations 1989 [2.23] describes the main health and 
safety requirements for the UK for all electrical equipment, including high voltage 
apparatus. According to the regulations, electrical equipment is defined as “anything 
used or intended to be used and installed to generate, provide, transmit, transform, 
rectify, convert, conduct, distribute, control, store, measure or use electrical energy”. 
Also, system is defined as “an electrical system in which all electrical equipment is or 
may be electrically connected to a common source of electrical energy and includes 
such source and electrical equipment” [2.4, 2.23].
The regulation, classifies all employers, employees, self-employed persons as “duty 
holders” and requires them to cooperate in order to control risks. Furthermore, “all 
electrical equipment must not be put into use where its strength and capability may be 
exceeded so as to give rise to danger. Finally, all systems shall, so far is reasonably 
practicable, be constructed and maintained so as to prevent danger”.[2.23] Further 
guidelines are given to the HSE document ‘Memorandum of guidance on the Electricity 
at Work Regulations 1989’ [2.24] that accompanies these regulations. Other relevant 
regulations include the ‘Electrical Equipment (Safety) Regulations, 1994’ [2.25] and the 
‘The Electricity Safety, Quality and Continuity Regulations 2002’ [2.26]. Such legal 
requirements of electrical companies are specifically referenced in the technical 
specifications of individual companies [2.27-2.29].
2-17
2.5 Deterministic Risk Assessment of High Voltage Earthing 
Systems
British Standard BS 7430 [2.30] concerning the earthing practice in power stations and 
substations, is based on the legal requirements described in Section 2.4. For safety 
purposes, the earth bonding should make certain that any voltage, which could possibly 
appear on equipment under normal or abnormal conditions, and can be accessible 
should be below a dangerous level. Furthermore, in order to protect certain auxiliary 
plants, it is recommended that the rise of earth potential and fault clearance time should 
be as low as practicable [2.30].
In order to ensure that these conditions are met, the earthing system should have certain 
essential characteristics; a low resistance of the earthing system must be obtained 
regardless of the weather variations, under normal operating conditions or in case of 
fault or surge discharge conditions, the current-carrying capability of the earth 
electrodes should be guaranteed. Also the earth connection conductors from any devices 
need to be as short and straight as possible to keep surge impedance at minimum and, 
importantly, these installations should be robust and constructed of appropriate 
materials to avoid corrosion.
It is interesting to note that BS 7430 specifies that the resistance of the earthing system 
for high voltage systems should be such that the rise of earth potential is “as low as can 
be achieved reasonable and economically” [2.30]. Maximum values of EPR are 
indicated in order to provide deterministic guidelines to follow. Hence, for earth faults 
of short duration, the potential rise should not exceed 430 V rms, or if the fault is 
cleared in less than 0.2 s, then the EPR cannot be more than 650 V rms. The same 
voltages are also accepted for the telecommunication systems [2.30].
Another relevant standard (ITU-T K.33) [2.31] specifies limits for safety of people 
exposed to coupling between telecommunications systems and ac electric power
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systems. In this standard, a distinction is made between limits applicable under (i) 
‘typical’ and (ii) ‘severe’ conditions. Typical conditions are described by work carried 
out by trained or experienced personnel, and when the electrocution circuit consists of 
current paths only from hand to hand or hand to feet. In this situation, the tolerable 
current is assumed to be curve c2 of IEC 479-1 [2.17] and on which the following 
Table 2.1 is based.
Table 2.1: Limit Voltage Values for Fault Duration Ranges [2.31].
Duration of faults t 
(s)
Admissible Limit 
(V)
t <0.1 2000
0.1 < t < 0.2 1500
0.2< t < 0.35 1000
0.35 < t <0.5 650
0.5 < t<  1.0 430
A situation is considered severe when the current paths also include hand to hip or hand 
to chest. The source impedance is neglected, and in this case, the maximum allowable 
body current is deduced from curve cx of IEC 60479-1. Table 2.2 summarises the 
allowable voltages.
Table 2.2: Limiting Values for Severe Situations [2.31].
Duration of faults t 
(s)
Admissible Limit 
General 
(V)
Admissible limit when 
current paths through 
chest or hip need not be 
considered 
(V)
t < 0.06 430 650
t < 0.1 430 430
0.1<t<  1.0 300 300
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Hence, the deterministic approach of assessing an earthing system consists of assuming 
a worst case scenario, estimating the maximum touch and step voltages and comparing 
these calculated voltages with the allowable limits.
Chapter 3 gives a detailed description of the various assumptions made by the main 
earthing standards, and quantifies their discrepancies when assessing earthing systems. 
These variations are a result not only of the different approaches of calculating the 
maximum touch and step voltages but are also due to determination of the accidental 
circuit and adopted allowable body current. It is a concern that deterministic 
assessments could lead to conservative results and over-designing of the earthing 
system.
The probabilistic nature of many of these parameters has led to a gradual adoption of 
quantitative risk assessment in the electrical industry as a second stage assessment of 
the earthing systems following the application of the aforementioned deterministic 
criteria.
2.6 Probabilistic Risk Assessment of High Voltage Earthing Systems
Over the past few years, the electrical industry worldwide has started recognising the
probabilistic nature of the exposure to earth potential rise and the effect of current on 
the human body. Significant research for the last twenty five years has taken place 
worldwide in order to develop procedures for calculating the risk of death associated 
with substations or other high voltage installations. These processes were developed 
either as a guide for the design of new earthing systems or as tools for the assessment of 
the already existing installations.
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Such processes have recently started being employed by various transmission and 
distribution companies [2.27, 2.32-2.34], and the industry is looking for even more 
rigorous and comprehensive procedures for the assessment of their systems.
Figure 2.6 shows the integration of probabilistic risk assessment in earthing system 
design as a second stage assessment, as applied in industry. As can be seen, once the 
possible hazards have been identified, the maximum step and touch voltages 
representing the worst case scenario are being calculated.
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System Description
1st Stage 
Assessment
Acceptable? 
(Depending on 
selected standard)
NO
2nd Stage 
Assessment
Is Individual Risk 
Acceptable? 
ALARP Criterion
YES
NO
YES
Mitigation
Hazard Identification
No Further 
Action 
Required
No Further 
Action 
Required
Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis
Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment
Initial 
Recommendations 
for low cost 
mitigations
Determination of Hot 
Zone extent 
Maximum Touch/Step 
Voltages
Figure 2.6: Integration of Probabilistic Risk Assessment as a second stage assessment of earthing 
system design.
Then, the obtained voltages are compared with the selected criteria and the first stage 
assessment is completed by deciding whether the levels of these voltages are acceptable 
or not. If the maximum touch and step voltages are below the predefined limits, the 
system is considered safe. If not, as seen in Section 2.3.4, the likelihood of the hazard
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materializing (i.e. probability of occurrence of an earth fault and rise of earth potential) 
and the likelihood of a person being present in a position that gets him/her exposed to a 
hazardous voltage (i.e. probability of presence) are taken under consideration [2.21]. If 
electrocution does occur, death is not certain but depending on the current magnitude 
that flows through the body and the shock duration, the probability of ventricular 
fibrillation can be deduced.
Therefore, the main principle for assessing the risk of death from electrocution or 
individual risk (IR) is to calculate the product of three probabilities:
1R— PEPR X  Ppr X  P VF (2.1)
With Pepr : probability of earth potential rise, Ppr : probability of presence and Pvf : 
probability of ventricular fibrillation. It should be emphasized, however, that there are 
several variations in calculating each of these terms, and depending on the approach 
followed, the focus maybe different on the modelled parameters since various 
assumptions can be made for their estimation based either on measurements, historical 
data or simulation. In this review, the working principles behind each approach are 
recalled and those that have gained acceptance in time are highlighted.
The approach followed in this investigation is to consider each of the three parameters 
separately and keep the same notation of the various probabilities so that it is easier to 
discuss and compare them.
2.6.1 Probability of EPR ( P Ep r )
The Probability of EPR is calculated from historical fault records kept by transmission 
companies. Although the historical data in most cases are not enough to estimate the 
fault frequency for a specific substation, national statistics give a good estimate of the 
expected faults throughout the year. It is worth mentioning that only 25% to 50% of the 
faults will result in significant current flow to or from the substation earth mat [2.27].
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2.6.2 Probability of Presence (PPr)
The Probability of Presence (Z^) is the likelihood of a person being in a position that 
exposes them to a hazardous voltage. Depending on whether touch or step voltage 
scenarios are investigated, the exposure will vaiy. In the first case, for touch voltages, 
the total time of a person coming in contact with a metallic structure over one year 
period can be estimated. In the case of step voltages, exposure can be estimated as the 
time that a person will be in a substation or outside where he/she can be exposed to EPR 
over the period of one year.
2.6.3 Probability of Ventricular Fibrillation (Pvf)
As seen in Section 2.4.1, heart fibrillation is considered as the primary cause of death 
and, therefore, all earthing standards worldwide have based their limits of allowable 
body current on the maximum current that does not cause this heart condition. However, 
experimental work on livestock [2.35-2.37] has shown that the fibrillating current is not 
the same for all animals of the same species including humans, but there is a statistical 
variation.
Two standards, namely IEEE Standard 80 [2.18] and IEC 60479-1 [2.17], provide 
limits of allowable body current. IEEE Std-80 provides allowable body currents as a 
function of shock duration for:
• For body weight of 50 kg: I B = — and (2.2)
VI
• For body weight of 70 kg: I B = (2.3)
■y/t
On the other hand, EEC 60479-1 proposes curves cx, c2 and c3 given on Figure 2.4 
which give body current against shock duration which correspond in 0%, 5% and 50%
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probability of ventricular fibrillation respectively. Based on these two standards, various 
approaches have been developed.
2.6.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Practice
A straightforward practice is to assume a fault clearance time (i.e. 200 ms) and then 
determine the maximum allowable step and touch voltages for that shock duration based 
on the selected IEEE equation or IEC curve for allowable body current. If this limit is 
exceeded, death from ventricular fibrillation is considered certain, hence, the probability 
of heart fibrillation is equal to one [2.32].
A probabilistic risk assessment of step and touch potentials near transmission line 
structures was published by El-Kady et al. [2.38-2.41]. The outline of the process 
consists of determining the applied voltage and the withstand voltage distributions.
A probabilistic fault analysis program is used to evaluate the tower potential rise in case 
of a fault. Once the locations of interest have been defined, the program using the 
Monte-Carlo simulation method calculates the probability distributions of line currents 
and voltages. The simulation process takes into consideration the random variations in 
the system generation, transmission operating conditions and the fault time, location and 
type. The analysis calculates the potential rise at the tower or towers of interest. Finally, 
the step and touch voltages are calculated either by modelling the tower and soil in the 
vicinity or by the use of empirical equations. For a number of simulations, the obtained 
voltages are used to generate the “applied voltage” distribution [2.38, 2.40,2.41].
The next stage of this approach involves the generation of the “withstand voltage” 
distribution. The withstand voltages are calculated from IEEE St-80 electrocution
equation I B = where Ib is the threshold current for ventricular fibrillation. Then,
V/
the withstand step and touch voltages can be calculated from:
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O.W6(Rb +2Rg) 
f t
and (2.4)
Vv  WT
0M6(Rb+0.5Rg)
Tt
(2.5)
A uniform distribution for a range of fault durations, t, from 0.03 s to 3 s is used to 
sample randomly possible shock durations. The body impedance, Rb, can be either of a 
single value (e.g. 1000 O) or can be voltage dependent, in which case the 5% curve of 
the IEC 60479-1 [2.17] is used. Rg corresponds to the foot to ground impedance which 
is proportional to soil resistivity and is given by Rg = 3 • p s . A single value can be
provided for soil resistivity but it is suggested that if its statistical distribution for the 
area of interest is available, then it should be incorporated in the process. The withstand 
voltages calculated for the different values of the three contributing parameters are used 
to generate the “withstand voltage” distribution. The convolution of the withstand and 
the applied voltage distributions yields Probability of Ventricular Fibrillation.
The Probability of Presence is the probability that a ground fault occurs in the area 
under investigation and that a person is present at the time of fault. Here, it is assumed 
that the number of ground faults that occur during certain periods of time follows the 
Poisson distribution. Then, the probability of a ground fault over the period of one year, 
T, is found for number k of ground faults during the period T and X the average 
frequency of ground faults per year. The period that a person is present in the selected 
area over a year is also estimated assuming that if he/she is present, he/she will be 
exposed. The Probability of Presence is calculated analytically [2.41] and then is 
multiplied to the Probability of Ventricular Fibrillation to obtain the overall risk [2.38- 
2.41].
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Based on this work, Wang et al. [2.42-2.44] have worked on refining the equations 
corresponding to the fault clearance time, body impedance and foot to ground 
resistance. As before, the withstand voltage distribution was derived from IEEE std-80 
equation of threshold current for ventricular fibrillation.
In 1992, building upon the previous concept and Wang’s work, Sverak et al. [2.45] 
published an enhanced method for determining the total probability of a fatal accident. 
The main improvements concerned the introduction of the frequency and duration of 
ground faults and the frequency and duration of a man’s presence in the hazardous area, 
as random variables. The frequency of a person’s presence and the frequency of ground 
faults were assumed to follow Poisson’s distribution law. The duration of presence was 
randomly selected from a time range, and the duration of fault was taken from system 
operational statistics. The joint probability that the random presence of someone in the 
exposure area will coincide with the occurrence of a ground fault is then solved 
analytically. For all the possible different visiting frequencies and corresponding 
durations as well as for all the probable number of faults and their durations, the overall 
probability of a person getting exposed over a period of a year is then calculated [2.45].
2.6.5 Different Approaches to Calculation of Ventricular Fibrillation
The previous approaches do not implement the probabilistic nature of the effect of body 
current suggested by IEC 60479-1 since the generated withstand voltage distribution 
was based on the statistical variation of parameters such as the fault duration, body 
impedance and soil resistivity. An approach that takes into consideration this effect, and 
is currently adopted by some UK electricity utilities [2.21, 2.33] is presented in the 
following flowchart.
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Figure 2.7: Risk Assessment Process followed in the UK.
Initially, for the estimation of Probability of Ventricular Fibrillation, the worst case 
scenario conditions are assumed which would result in a maximum touch/step voltage. 
Then, by using single values for body resistance (i.e. 1000 Q), footwear resistance (i.e. 
4000 kD per shoe) and soil resistivity, the maximum current that will flow through the 
human body is calculated. For a fault clearance time of 200 ms, the Probability of VF 
(P vf) is determined using the three curves c ,, c2 and c3 of Figure 2.4, and applying a 
simplified stepwise model approach. This condition, is described by a point falling 
between curves c2 and c3 meaning that the Probability of VF is more than 5% but less
than 50%. The stepwise model errs on the safe side, and a 50% value of Pyp is selected.
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If a current-time point falls to the left of the c ,  safety curve, then P v f  is considered to be
zero. However, if it is above the c3 curve and the 50% value, then the probability of VF
is considered to be one [2.21, 2.33]. The Probability of Exposure and the Probability of 
EPR are calculated as described in Paragraphs 2.6.1 and 2.6.2
A similar methodology for calculating the probability of VF is suggested by Raafat 
[2.27], with the difference that the IEC curves of body current against time are 
converted to touch/step voltage against time curves. Then, the voltage exposure is 
estimated by assuming a worst case scenario and the band on which the probability of 
VF lies is found for a given shock duration [2.27].
A different approach for calculating the fibrillation probability is suggested by Nahman 
[2.46-2.48]. Curve c3 which corresponds to the 50% percentile is approximated by the 
following equations,
r 1.6 A for t<0 .1s  (2.6)
If5 0= < 0.16/tA for 0 . 1 s < t < 2 s  (2.7)
^0.08 A for t>  2 s (2.8)
where t is the shock duration. A lognormal probability density function for the
fibrillating current is assumed with: I F = I F50 • 101176/w (2.9)
The coefficient 1.176 in Equation (2.9) is the standard deviation of the probability 
distribution of log(Ip/lF5o) and was obtained from the IEC curves including the 95% 
percentile curve [2.49]. RN is a normally distributed random number with zero mean 
and a unity standard deviation. For every random number RN, a different fibrillating 
current is produced which later is compared to an applied body current to determine 
whether fibrillation occurs.
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If the applied body current is higher or equal to the fibrillating current, then depending 
on the shock duration which is also randomly selected, there are two cases.
r 0.2 for t<  HC/3 (2.10)
P  (VF) = “<
1 for t > HC/3 (2.11)
where HC is the heart cycle, estimated at 0.6 s for a heart rate of 100 per minute. This is 
based on the assumption that for every short shock duration, even with high current, 
ventricular fibrillation will not occur unless the shock occurs within the vulnerable 
period of the heart cycle.
Moreover, we need to note that in the approximate equation of the fibrillating 
current I F = I F50 *101 176/w, it is assumed that the standard deviation remains constant
for any shock duration. This is discussed further in Section 4.3 where the development 
of the probability surface of ventricular fibrillation is described, and an alternative 
approach with the advantage of providing more accurate probability values is proposed. 
A comprehensive process was suggested by Carman [2.50-2.52] who used IEC curves 
to build triangular distributions based upon the 5%, 50% and 95% percentiles for 
random shock durations. The shock durations are sampled from a uniform distribution 
across a range of selected times. Then, the generated triangular distributions were 
randomly sampled. Furthermore, considering the voltage dependency of the body 
impedance, the sampled fibrillating currents are used to develop a “withstand voltage” 
distribution.
Carman also took into consideration the different locations that a fault may occur at, for 
example on a transmission line, producing for each case a different fault current and 
hence a different earth potential rise. For any given EPR, a maximum and minimum 
touch voltages that may appear in a substation were deduced, and these values were
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used to generate uniform distributions which are then randomly sampled. All the 
sampled values of possible touch voltages form the “applied voltage” distribution. The 
probability of ventricular fibrillation was then derived from the convolution of the 
applied and withstand probability functions [2.50-2.53].
2.7 Acceptable Levels of Risk
Once the level of risk has been calculated through a quantitative risk assessment, it is 
assessed against criteria to determine whether the risk is acceptable, and if not, to decide 
the degree of mitigation that is required.
There is a distinction between tolerable risk and acceptable risk according to HSE 
publication “Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Stations” [2.54] “Tolerability does not 
mean acceptability”. Tolerable risk means that the risk is not regarded as negligible and 
is not ignored but is kept under review and is further reduced if practicable. In other 
words, tolerability refers to a certain degree of risk that is considered to be acceptable in 
order to secure some benefits, while at the same time being confident that it is properly 
controlled. Therefore, if a risk is characterized as tolerable, it should be reduced to a 
level that is “As Low As Reasonably Practicable” or ALARP. The concept of ALARP 
was initially introduced in 1992 for safety in nuclear stations [2.54] but now finds 
application more generally [2.6].
On the other hand, if a risk is acceptable it means that the risk level is low enough not to 
require any further reduction and it is acceptable as it is. However, reviewing on a 
regular basis may be required to make certain that the risk remains to the same level 
[2.21, 2.55]. The framework for the tolerability of risk according to the HSE is shown 
in Figure 2.8.
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Unacceptable region 1 in 1000 per person/yr (Workers)
The ALARP or Tolerability 
region (Risk is undertaken 
only if a benefit is desired)
')
1 in 10,000 per person/)*- (Public)
Tolerable only if risk reduction 
is impracticable or if its cost is 
grossly disproportionate to the 
improvement gained
Tolerable if cost of reduction 
would exceed the 
improvement gained
1 in 1 million per person^r
Broadly acceptable region 
(No need for detailed working 
to demonstrate ALARP)
N ecessary to maintain 
a ss ira n c e  that risk 
remains at this level
1 in 10 million per person^ir
Negligible risk
Figure 2.8: HSE framework for the tolerability of risk [2.6].
The green zone represents the broadly acceptable area of individual risk and HSE sets 
the boundary between the acceptable and tolerable areas to be one in a million per 
annum for both workers and the public. The levels of risk represented in this region are 
described as “insignificant and trivial” compared to the risks that people take in their 
daily activities. Indeed, studies have shown that people involve themselves daily in 
activities which bear much higher risks and they are prepared to accept them because of
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the benefits they bring. Such activities would be the use of gas and electricity, air travel 
etc. As we move from the bottom of the triangle to the top, a higher level of risk is 
represented for a particular activity, and we enter in the tolerable zone. These levels of 
risk can be tolerated as long as the following conditions apply :
• The risk assessment should be based on the “best available scientific evidence”, 
and when this is not available on the “best scientific advice”. This way the 
nature and level of risk will be determined, and the appropriate measures for 
controlling these risks will be applied.
• The level of risk should be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).
• Regular review of the risk is required to verify that it remains in the ALARP 
zone. Any new knowledge about the risk or techniques that can help to control 
the risk should be taken into consideration in the reviews.
The boundary between tolerable and unacceptable region is different for workers and 
the public. For workers, the limit of individual risk of death is suggested to be one in 
thousand workers per annum, while for the public it should be an order of magnitude 
lower, which is one in ten thousand per annum [2.6].
The HSE acknowledges that if the individual risk is close to the upper limit, then it also 
“gives rise to societal concerns” which often have a great impact when deciding 
whether a risk is tolerable or not [2.6].
It should be noted that British industry, generally, manages to control risks well below 
those limits and often they set the limits of upper tolerability of risk to even lower 
levels. For example British Rail in their safety plan in 1992, set the upper tolerability 
risk limit for employees as one in ten thousand per annum while for passengers the 
upper limit is one in hundred thousand [2.34].
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The red zone is the unacceptable region regardless of the benefits gained by the practice 
of the hazardous activity. Therefore, any activities or practices that are of such high risk 
should be excluded from any working process unless changes can be applied in order to 
reduce the level of risk to tolerable or acceptable levels [2.6].
The HSE criteria find great application in the UK electricity industry as evidenced in 
several risk assessment reports obtained from the utilities. The calculated risk of death 
from electrocution is assessed against these criteria in order to base their decision 
making for further mitigation or not [2.27, 2.33, 2.34]. Also, the Energy Networks 
Association follows the same practice, as set out in documents assessing risk for BT 
operators working in EPR zone and for third parties using equipment connected to BT 
lines [2.56, 2.57].
2.8 Mitigation in Power Systems
If the risk assessment process has shown that the risk is unacceptable, steps need to be 
taken to control those risks. The measures taken to reduce the risk are called mitigation. 
In power systems, there are several ways that the standards suggest in order to deal with 
hazardous touch and step voltages.
If the impedance of the earth grid is too high, the grid can be interconnected with other 
grids. Another way to reduce the overall earth impedance is the use of extended earthing 
systems formed by tower lines and cables and connected to the main grid. It is also 
suggested that for a substation placed in an area of high soil resistivity, a satellite grid in 
a nearby low resistivity area can be connected. However, this may result in exporting 
the earth potential rise to a greater distance away making it harder to control presence 
and exposure of the public. Enhancement of an existing grid may also be achieved by 
installing deep-driven earth rods or piles or drilled earth wells. This practice is 
beneficial for penetrating deeper earth layers of low and stable resistivity [2.21].
2-34
The chemical treatment of the soil is another way to reduce the soil resistivity and 
mainly the treatment is applied to the soil surrounding the earth electrodes. Usually, the 
use of salts is preferred which, however, requires regular maintenance because the 
applied salts can be washed away by the rain. Other chemicals that may be used are 
Magnesium Sulphate and Calcium Sulphate. Because of the corrosion effects that some 
substances may have on the earth electrodes, it is suggested that the treatment is applied 
only when no alternative option exists and there is the need for immediate mitigation 
[2.21,2.32].
Apart from trying to reduce the overall impedance of the earthing system, various 
practices are utilized in order to increase the resistance of the accidental path so that a 
smaller current passes through the human body. The most common method of achieving 
this is through the application of a layer of gravel on the surface of the substation. This 
provides a high resistance barrier even under wet conditions although the thickness of 
the layer can be compromised by vehicles traveling or poor practice, so yet again 
maintenance is a major issue [2.21,2.32]. Additional series resistances such as gloves or 
special boots can have significant effects on the tolerability of touch and step voltages, 
and various standards take them into consideration when calculating allowable voltages 
[2.20, 2.22, 2.31,2.58].
In Section 2.4.3, it was noted that ventricular fibrillation depends not only on current 
magnitude but also on the shock duration. The fault clearance time that is assumed to be 
equal to the shock duration varies depending on the kind of fault, the magnitude of 
return current and the circuit breaker. Technological advances in breakers have resulted 
in shorter clearance times, therefore, fast-operating circuit breaker may be installed in a 
substation especially if there is a great need to control the risk.
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In cases where there is a proven hazardous voltage at a specific location in the 
substation or at a tower base, access can be prevented by the use of fences, and signs are 
erected to warn the public or worker of the potential hazards. Finally, at locations which 
are frequently visited, it is possible to provide insulation to earthing downleads or any 
other exposed metalwork and reduce the possibility of electrocution [2.21].
2.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, an extensive literature review on risk and the various approaches of 
probabilistic risk assessment was carried out. First, the regulatory framework upon 
which the risk assessment is based on was investigated, and it was shown that 
probabilistic risk assessment in power systems is currently integrated as a second stage 
assessment of the earthing system design and is calculated by the product of three 
probabilities; probability of earth potential rise (P e p r ) ,  probability of the presence of a 
person in a position that exposes them to a hazardous voltage (Ppr) and probability of 
ventricular fibrillation (P v f) -
Ventricular fibrillation is the primary cause of death following electrocution, and zones 
of allowable body current against shock duration were produced, based on statistical 
results from animal experiments. In various approaches of risk assessment studied in 
this review, it was found that these zones are usually used to deduce threshold currents 
for given shock durations or estimate the probability of death from an electric shock. 
However, it is evident that a more rigorous approach is required for the more accurate 
calculation of the probability of ventricular fibrillation. Moreover, it was shown that the 
various parameters concerning the accidental circuit (e.g. body resistance) or the 
protection system (e.g. fault clearance time, fault current etc) were treated 
deterministically usually assuming a worst case scenario.
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In this work, further investigations supported by studies of historical fault data have 
allowed to develop the proposed probabilistic risk assessment method.
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CHAPTER 3. AN APPRAISAL OF STANDARD 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFETY CRITERIA ON 
ELECTRICAL EARTHING SYSTEMS
3.1 Introduction
Various standard recommendations are currently implemented around the world, 
providing guidelines for the design and testing of electrical earthing systems. IEEE 80 
(2000) [3.1] is widely used in USA and other countries. BS 7354 (1990) [3.2] and EA­
TS 41-24 (1992) [3.3], a British Electricity Association Standard, are in use in the UK. 
ITU-T K.33 (1996) [3.4] is published by the International Telecommunication Union 
and the CENELEC HD 637 SI (1999) [3.5] standard comes from the European 
Committee of Electrotechnical Standardization.
Previous studies have shown that, due to different assumptions used for calculating the 
various parameters of a given earthing grid, there are substantial differences between 
the recommended values of tolerable voltages and, consequently, of the safety-limits 
that are applicable for an earth grid. The initial studies carried out by the author and 
other investigators [3.6-3.10] have established, through calculation of the generated 
potentials following an earth fault, that the above standards recommendations do not 
compare very well.
Safety is evaluated using the tolerable current values for human bodies [3.11, 3.12] and 
an equivalent circuit for various electrocution scenarios having a source voltage due to 
potentials generated from fault current flow through the earthing system.
The calculation of generated voltages on the earthing system and its vicinity relies either 
on simplified analytical approaches or computer simulation [3.13]. However, significant 
differences may also arise between these calculations depending on the approach used.
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The main differences lie within the assumptions made for the accidental circuit and the 
definition o f‘Touch” voltage.
In this section, the accidental circuit will be analysed according to each of the main 
standards, as well as the equations providing the maximum and withstand voltages. The 
main assumptions made by each standard will be examined in order to gain a full 
understanding of the results taken from the parametric analysis that will follow and the 
development of safety-limit surfaces.
3.2 American Standard: IEEE std- 80 
3.2.1 Safety Voltage Definitions
According to the American standard IEEE std-80 [3.1], the following definitions are 
applicable:
• Mesh voltage: The maximum touch voltage within a mesh of a ground grid
• Touch voltage: The potential difference between the ground potential rise (GPR) 
and the surface potential at the point where a person is standing while at the 
same time having a hand in contact with a grounded structure.
• Step voltage: The difference in surface potential experienced by a person 
bridging a distance of 1 m with the feet without contacting any other grounded 
object.
• Transferred voltage: A special case of the touch voltage where a voltage is 
transferred into or out of the substation from or to a remote point external to the 
substation site.
3.2.2 Calculation of maximum mesh and step voltages
The IEEE 80 Standard [3.1] provides equations for determining the design parameters 
and calculating the values of both touch and step voltages. In deriving these equations,
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it was assumed that the earth grid is of rectangular shape, equally spaced and buried at 
depth h in a homogenous soil of constant resistivity. The grid can consist of n parallel 
conductors all of them assumed to be of diameter d  each, spaced D meters apart, and 
of an undetermined number of connections.
The following equation determines the value of a mesh voltage on the ground surface 
above the centre of a comer mesh,
E = p ' K» ' K‘ Ig (3 1)
m j  ' '
M
where
Em is the mesh voltage in V, 
p  is the average soil resistivity in Qm
IG is the maximum rms current flowing from ground grid to earth
Lm is the total length of buried conductors, including cross connections and the
combined length of ground rods in m,
Km is the spacing factor for mesh voltage,
and K { is the corrective factor for current irregularity.
The relationship between Em and Km depends largely on the current density in the 
perimeter conductors versus the current density in the inner conductors with K m 
provided from the following equation.
* _ =  1
2 -7 t
In D1 | (D + 2-h)1 K„+  — ^ * l n  
K u 7r(l • n - 1)
(3.2)
16 h d  8 D d  4 d
With K n and Kh being ftirther correcting terms. In order to determine the worst case 
for step voltage, the following equation is provided.
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(3.3)
where
Es is the step voltage in V,
Ls is the total length of buried conductors, including cross connections, and the total 
effective length of ground rods in m, and
K s is the mesh factor defined for n parallel conductors and is determined from the 
following equation.
The standard states that “the maximum step voltage is assumed to occur over a distance 
of 1 m, beginning at and extending outside of the perimeter conductor at the angle 
bisecting the most extreme comer of the grid” [3.1]. For the calculation of Ks , the grid 
is assumed to be buried at depths of 0.25m<h<2.5m.
3.2.3 Accidental circuit
The accidental circuit for a touch voltage scenario according to the IEEE 80 American 
practice is shown in Figure 3.1. A 1000 Q body resistance (RB) is assumed, which 
represents the resistance of a human body from hand-to-feet and also from hand-to 
hand, or from one foot to the other foot [3.1]. The human foot is represented as a 
conducting metallic disc of radius b (m). Its ground resistance in ohms on the surface of 
a homogeneous earth of resistivity p  (Q • m) is given by Laurent [3.14].
(3.4)
(3.5)
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Terminal H
R q = Body Resistance
Terminal F
VTh = Touch voltage
Figure 3.1: Touch voltage circuit [3.1].
According to IEEE 80, this metallic disc is considered to be of 0.08 m radius. The 
equations the equivalent Thevenin impedance (Zlh ) are then given by:
For touch voltage accidental circuit: Zm = 1.5 p  (3.6)
For step voltage accidental circuit: Zlh = 6 P (3.7)
In order to account for the effect of a surface layer p s in a substation (usually high
resistivity crashed rock layer), a corrective factor Cs is introduced in the computation of
the foot resistance. If no protective surface layer is used then, Cs -1  and p s = p .  The
consideration of higher Cs values in the latest version of IEEE std-80 has lead to higher
values of foot resistances and, consequently, higher tolerable step and touch voltages 
[3.15].
Any other additional resistances in series with the body resistance such as hand and 
foot contact resistances and glove and shoe resistances are ignored. The American 
standard acknowledges that the above equations are “conservative in the sense that they 
underestimate the Thevenin equivalent impedance and, therefore, will result in higher 
body currents” [3.16-3.18]. In this investigation, a parametric analysis was carried out
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to determine to what extent the permissible voltages are affected by additional
resistances and hence, develop better understanding of the safety criteria.
Therefore, the permissible total equivalent voltages are:
For touch voltage equivalent circuit: Etouch = I B (RB +1.5p) (3.8)
For step voltage equivalent circuit: Estep -  IB (RB + 6p) (3.9)
3.3 The UK Practice: BS 7354
3.3.1 Safety Voltage Definitions
In the BS 7354 [3.2], touch voltage is defined as “the sum of the voltage across 1 m of 
surface along a diagonal outside the comer of a grid with the voltage difference of the 
grid with the ground surface above. The comers are where the maximum voltage 
gradients occur”. It is acknowledged that IEEE std-80 uses the mesh voltage as the 
touch voltage and, thus, the two practices correspond to step voltage but not for touch 
voltage. The step voltage is defined as 4tthe voltage over 1 m of surface diagonally 
outwards from a comer of a grid”.
3.3.2 Calculation of touch and step voltages
The maximum predicted touch and step voltages are given as:
VT
nRL
eh ' 0.5
+
\ u J
1 1 1 -  0.5”“21
2h D+h D
■K, (3.10)
And
.  v = p V ( ' '
s nRL
1 1 1-0.5 '+  +
2h D + h D
Kk (3.11)
where h is the grid depth, d  is the diameter of the conductors, L is the total length of 
the conductors and the rods, D is the spacing of the conductors and n the number of the 
parallel conductors.
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The corrective factor Kt is slightly different from the one used in IEEE std-80 and is 
given by: K t,=  (0.15/2 + 0.7) (3.12)
3.3.3 Accidental circuit
According to BS 7354 [3.2], the accidental circuit can be described using the following 
figure.
VT
h
Rjw Rc
T ~~ ~~l— I_______I-
Rb
Rfw Rr
Figure 3.2: Touch voltage circuit.
Similar to IEEE std-80, BS 7354 assumes a 1000 Q body resistance(RB). However, it
also takes into account the footwear resistance (R^)using a value of 4000 Q per foot, 
and as can be seen in Figure 3.2, the so-called ‘contact resistance’ ( Rc) at the surface of 
the ground is also included with a value of 3p per foot.
Therefore, the permissible voltages are:
For touch voltage equivalent circuit: Vt = IA RB + { R / w  + R c )] (3.13)
For step voltage equivalent circuit: Vs = I t + (3.14)
The allowable body current /, here is taken from curve c2 of Figure 20 of IEC 479-1
[3.12] corresponding to 5% probability of ventricular fibrillation.
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3.4 CENELEC Standard HD 637 S1
3.4.1 Safety Voltage Definitions
The European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) [3.5], in an 
attempt to create a harmonized standard in support of European legislation and provide 
a more complete approach of the earthing problem, has introduced the concept of the 
“prospective touch voltage” and a more analytic accidental circuit.
• Touch voltage(VT): The part of the earth potential rise due to an earth fault 
which can be picked up by a person, assuming that the current is flowing via the 
human body from hand to feet.
• Source voltage for touching (FST) (“prospective touch voltage”): The voltage
which appears during an earth fault between conductive parts and earth when 
these parts are not being touched (source voltage).
• Step voltage (Vs ): The part of the earth potential rise due to an earth fault which
can be picked up by a person with a step-width of 1 m, assuming that the current 
is flowing via the human body from foot to foot.
3.4.2 Accidental circuit
CENELEC standard recognizes that the body impedance depends on the touch voltages 
and the current path. The body impedance values for current paths of hand to hand or 
hand to foot are taken from the IEC 60479-1 standard [3.12] where the values of 50% 
confidence level are used. Moreover, a correction factor is introduced in order to care 
for the different current paths i.e. 0.75 for hand to feet current. As can be seen in
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Figure 3.3, the standard utilises additional resistances Ra = Ral + Ra2, where Ral is the 
resistance of the footwear (equal to 1 k£l) and Ral the resistance to earth of the standing 
point.
i i
ZB UTp
Figure 3.3: Accidental circuit for touch voltage [3.5].
USTp is the “voltage difference acting as a source voltage in the touching circuit with a
limited value that guarantees the safety of a person when using additional known 
resistances” [3.5]. When no additional resistances are taken into account, USlp is equal
to UTp.
The maximum permissible voltage is calculated through an iterative process described 
by:
U sip f ) = UTp (tF ) + (Ral + Ral )IB (3.15)
where tF is the fault duration and / Bthe current flowing through the human body 
obtained from curve c2 of Figure 20 in IEC 60479-1 [3.12].
3.5 EA-TS 41-24:1992
The Electrical Association in 1992 produced a Technical Specification (EA-TS 41-24)
[3.3] which is used by the electricity industry in the UK.
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3.5.1 Calculation of maximum predicted voltages
For the calculation of maximum voltages, EA-TS 41-24 provides equations which are 
based on “the recognised concept of integrating the voltage gradient, given by the 
product of soil resistivity and current density through the soil, over a distance of one 
metre” [3.3]. It is very important to be able to calculate the touch voltages on the fence 
surrounding a substation since fences can easily be accessed by the public. The 
equations are very similar to those provided by IEEE std-80, and they also consider the 
case where the fence is separately earthed and bonded [3.3]. So, for substations with a 
separately earthed fence and normal buried grid depths, the external touch potential at 
the edge of the grid is given by:
. kt kd p - I
t^(grid) ~ ^  (3.16)
where ke is a factor which accounts for the effect of a uniformly distributed electrode 
current over the grid, and kd is a factor which modifies ke to consider the non-uniform 
distribution of electrode current. The external touch potential at the fence is given by: 
k f kd p - I
E,( f w  = 1 L —  (3.17)
where kf  =0.26ke
When the fence is bonded to the earth grid system, the external touch potential at the 
fence El{fence) without an external peripheral electrode is the same as the El{gnd) in
(3.16). In the case where the external buried peripheral conductor is 1 metre away from 
the fence, then Et{fence) is given by:
k f e ' kd ' P ' 1Et{fence)= -L — r  (3.18)
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where kfe, kd, ke and kf  are factors that depends on grid geometry, and L is the total 
length of the conductors and rods.
3.5.2 Accidental circuit
The accidental circuit in EA-TS 41-24 is similar to that in BS 7354 since it utilises a 
constant body resistance of 1 kQ and footwear resistance of 4 kQ per shoe. In the case 
of a surface of chippings (typically 150 mm of thickness), another 2 kQ. per shoe is 
added. Moreover, the standard provides curves of statistically safe step and touch 
voltages based on curve c, of IEC 60479-1. It is interesting to mention that, of the 
standards making use the IEC 60479 curves to determine allowable touch and step 
voltages, EA-TS 41-24 is the only one that uses curve cx.
3.6 Derivation of safety-limit curves
As was seen in previous sections, IEEE 80, EA-TS 41-24 and BS 7354 provide 
equations to calculate maximum predicted voltages as well as equations or guidelines 
for the calculation of tolerable step and touch voltages. For each case, these equations 
were used for the calculation of the maximum tolerable magnitude of fault current, and 
hence deducing the recently suggested [3.1] safety limit-curves for the standards 
considered in this study.
3.6.1 Derivation of safety-limit curves for IEEE std 80
The maximum allowable grid current that generates touch voltage magnitudes that are 
within the tolerable limits for a person weighing 50 kg is obtained by combining 
Equations (3.1) and (3.8):
= (lOOO + 1 .5 -C , •/>,)• — (3.19)
3-11
which gives
I Gtouch50 = (1000 + 1.5 Cs ps) 0.116
r
&
(3.20)
P - K ^ K ,
Similarly, the maximum allowable grid current that generates safe touch voltages for a 
70 kg person is given by the following:
IGtouch10 = (1000 +1.5 *C5 ps) 0.157 (3.21)
P - K „ K ,
Using the same approach for the evaluation of step voltages, it can be shown that the 
maximum allowable grid currents for persons having 50 kg and 70 kg body weights are 
respectively:
IastepK =(1000 + 6 CS p s)
/ c 5 t e p 7 0 = ( l O O O  +  6  Cs p s)
0.116
0.157
P-K. -K,
p K s K,
(3.22)
(3.23)
3.6.2 Derivation of safety-limit curves for BS 73-54
Following the procedure described in the previous section, it can be shown that the 
maximum allowable grid current that generates safe levels of touch voltages is given by:
IGtouch = 1.027 • e ° 282 + 0.051 • e '+1766-,°,° |  / t  +  ^  ^
k 2 2
JC'Lr
1 1 1 -0 .5 "”2
■ +  +  ■
2h D + h D *rPJ )
and the corresponding step voltage equation is given by:
IGstep =
i \
1.027 -e°282 + 0.05 l e ,+1 76640,0 (/^  +  2 RF + 2 /^ ) - It-Lr
1 1 1 -0 .5"+ +
2 h D + h D KrP
(3.24)
(3.25)
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3.6.3 Derivation of safety-limit curves for EA-TS 41-24
As shown previously, combining the generated voltages arising under earth fault current 
with the tolerable levels, as determined from the tolerable current curve, allows the 
safety-limit-curves to be derived. In this investigation, the following equations were 
derived:
(a) Grid current for allowable external touch potential at the edge of the electrode:
-t i j
I Gtouch\ = (0.501 -e0286 + 0.039• e '+2 65T10"5)(30 0 0 + l . 5 p ^ ) - ^ —  (3 26)
kekdp
(b) Grid current for allowable external touch potential at the fence:
-t i T
I atouch2 = (0.501 -e0286 +0.039-e'*265710"5 )(3000 + 1.5pc)r)— —  (3 27)
kf kdp
(c) Grid current for allowable external touch potential at fence with no external buried 
peripheral electrode:
-t i T
I Gtouch3 = (0.501 • e 0286 + 0.039 • e '+26571°U5 )(3000 +1.5p  )--------  (3 28)
kekdp
(d) Grid current for allowable external touch potential at fence with external buried 
peripheral conductor 1 metre away from the fence:
-t i T
I Gtouch4 = (0.501-e0286 + 0.039-e '+2 65710"5 )(3000 + 1.5pg#) ~ — (3 .2 9 )
kfekdP
3-13
3.7 Parametric analysis of safety-limit surfaces
3.7.1 Previous work
Previous work [3.6] resulted in the establishment of worst-case safety-limit curves, to 
allow better comparison between the standards. Significant differences in the safety 
limit-curves based on the different standards were obtained. The differences were 
attributed to a combination of factors: (i) difference in assumed tolerable body current; 
(ii) differences in the parameters of the electrocution circuit; (iii) differences in the 
predicted touch voltage; and (iv) differences in the assumed worst-case shock location. 
However, the initial studies were limited to considering a generic 100x100m earth grid 
and only two values of earth resistivity lOOQm and lOOOQm.
The above work has been extended in this chapter by developing a fully computerised 
process for the determination of the safety-limits for grids of different size and design in 
terms of the maximum allowable fault current for a given fault duration. A full 
parametric variation of earth resistivity body resistance, grid size and mesh density was 
undertaken. The computations allow the construction of safety-limit surfaces, which are 
the threshold surfaces of maximum permissible fault current magnitude and duration, 
for the earthing parameter under consideration.
3.7.2 Effect of earth resistivity
Figure 3.4 shows the safety limit-surface for earth resistivity ranging from lOOQm to 
lOOOQm. A 100-mesh grid was used in this case with dimensions of lOOmxlOOm. The 
green surface corresponds to ‘50 kg’ touch voltage limit in IEEE 80, which is the most 
conservative case for nearly any earth resistivity. The red and yellow surfaces (top and 
middle surfaces) correspond to touch voltages limits in BS 7354 and EA-TS 41-24 
respectively.
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Figure 3.4: Safety limit-surfaces for 100x100m, 100-mesh grid as a function of earth resistivity.
3.7.3 Effect of grid size
The effect of changing grid area while keeping the number of meshes constant is shown 
in Figure 3.5. As can be seen, the allowable fault current magnitude increases with the 
grid area. The safety-limit surface for BS 7354 (red/top surface) is by far the least 
conservative case, followed by EA 41-24 (yellow/2nd from top surface) and, finally, 
blue and green (bottom) surfaces corresponding to IEEE 80 for 70kg and 50kg body 
weights respectively.
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Figure 3.5: Safety limit-surfaces for a grid in 100 Om earth resistivity as a function of grid surface 
area.
3.7.4 Effect of mesh density
The influence of the number of earth grid meshes on the safety-limit surfaces is shown 
in Figure 3.6. The number of meshes was varied from 9 to 10,000 for the lOOmxlOOm 
earth grid under investigation. From Figure 3.6, it can be seen that the safety limit- 
surfaces corresponding to IEEE 80 70kg and 50kg body weights (blue/top and 
green/near top surfaces respectively) intersect with the surface of BS 7354 (red/2nd from 
bottom surface) for particular parameter ranges. These ranges correspond to conditions 
of low mesh density which give high generated mesh voltages. This means that there is 
a range of possible scenarios for which BS 7354 is more conservative than IEEE 80 and 
vice versa.
3-16
1 50  kg weight in IEEE
2 70  kg weight in IEEE 
'3 B S  7354
4 EA-TS 41-24
* U U J
Number of Meshes
iwanon of Curr®*-
Figure 3.6: Safety limit-surfaces for a lOOmxlOOm grid in 100 ilm  earth resistivity as a function of 
number of meshes.
3.7.5 Effect of increasing area with constant mesh density
In Figure 3.7, the effect of increasing grid area while keeping the mesh density constant 
is examined. For this case, the mesh density is maintained at lmesh (square) per 25m , 
corresponding to a grid conductor spacing of 5m. This particular study reveals that as 
the size of the grid increases, the safety limit-surfaces of the different standards will 
overlap.
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Figure 3.7: Safety limit-surfaces for a grid in 100 Om earth resistivity with increasing area and 
constant mesh density.
3.7.6 Effect of body resistance
The estimation of body resistance is an important factor for the calculation of the 
tolerable current, and is considered by some investigators [3.9] to be mainly dependent 
on body weight, current path, surface area of contact and the applied voltage. IEC 
standard IEC 479-1 [3.12] specifies body resistance as a function of applied voltage but 
with a statistical spread of values about a mean curve. Each of the standards considered 
in this study assumes a constant 1000Q of body resistance without voltage dependence. 
However, it is useful to consider a variation in body resistance from 500Q to 6kQ which 
would represent well the practical extent of statistical variation.
Figure 3.8 shows the values of maximum magnitude of fault current for both BS 7354 
and EA-TS 41-24 as calculated for variable body resistance which show considerable 
variation in the allowable fault current-time thresholds. For example, with a fault of
3-18
100ms duration and a 1000Q body resistance, the fault current, according to EA-TS 41- 
24 and BS 7354, should not exceed 10600A and 23300A respectively. However, with a 
body resistance of 6000Q, maximum fault currents of 28500A and 63300A respectively 
could be tolerated. Given the very large effect that variation in body resistance has on 
the safety limit-surfaces, it is evident that an approach incorporating a voltage 
dependent body resistance as adopted in CENELEC HD 637 SI [3.5] is required.
Duration o f  fa u lt  c u r r e n t
■24
Figure 3.8: Safety limit-surfaces for a lOOmxlOOm grid in 100 Hm earth resistivity as a function of 
assumed body resistance.
3.8 C o n c lu s io n s
Three standards; IEEE 80, BS 7354 and EA-TS 41-24, were considered in this 
parametric study of the effects of earth resistivity, grid area and mesh density on the 
maximum allowable fault current for a given fault duration. Firstly, the safety limit 
equations were derived. Then, using a newly developed computer procedure, the results 
were visualised in the form of safety limit-surfaces as a function of the earthing
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parameters. A wide range of generic grid designs and earth resistivities have been 
considered and it is found that:
• Large variations exist between the safety limit-surfaces determined by the 
different standards.
• Differences found in these comparative studies are attributed mainly to the 
assumed probability of ventricular fibrillation, shock location and electrocution 
circuit.
• More extensive overlapping of the safety limits was predicted from different 
standards than was shown by an earlier study through a more comprehensive 
parametric study of earthing system parameters.
• Safety limit-curves and surfaces can be useful tools in identifying, whether a 
given standard may have safety and/or cost implications with the alternative 
standards.
• Harmonisation of earthing systems design standards require the inclusion of 
probabilistic parameters, and may lead to a less subjective approach to earthing 
systems design.
These probabilistic parameters concerning the accidental circuit as well as the system, 
are investigated in full detail in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, with the scope of 
integrating them in the proposed risk assessment process presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
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CHAPTER 4. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTERISED 
PROCEDURES FOR ELECTRICAL SAFETY CRITERIA
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the safety criteria adopted in different 
earthing standards vary significantly. This results in quite significant differences 
between what is regarded as safe. The parametric analysis has identified that apart from 
the differences in the accidental circuit and the calculation of prospective voltages, the 
standards do not compare well also because of the different criteria used for determining 
the allowable body current.
In order to compare the current practices of assessing safety, and understand the 
different criteria of allowable body current, it is necessary to examine the origin of these 
criteria and analyse their course of development over the past seventy years.
Although there are a great number of recorded electrical accidents and because of the 
various accident conditions, it is almost impossible to have accurate estimates of the 
current magnitude and shock duration and other parameters, necessary to deduce safety 
limits.
4.2 Review of previous work on allowable body current criteria
4.2.1 Early Work
In 1936, Ferris et al. [4.1] at Columbia University appear to be the first to conduct 
experiments on animals in an attempt to determine threshold current of electrocution. In 
1959, Kouwenhoven et al. [4.2] conducted further animal experiments, whose results 
were in agreement with work carried out by Ferris et al. [4.1]. They observed that the 
sheep’s heart was most vulnerable to electric shock, when the shock occurred during the
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‘T-phase’ of the electrocardiogram of the heart. The T-phase was discussed in Section 
2.4.3 and indicated the severe effect of current when the shock falls within this 
vulnerable phase of heart. So, for a current path from the right foreleg or chest to the left 
hind leg and with the use of a square wave generator with a variable delay circuit, they 
managed to position the shock at any desired point in the heart-cycle. The resistance of 
the current pathway through the animal was measured with an average of 650 Q. The 
result was a first quantitative determination of the minimum current causing ventricular 
fibrillation and that for “short shock durations, the susceptibility of the heart to fibrillate 
depends upon the relative timing of the shock to the heart cycle” as Dalziel C.F. pointed 
out in his discussion of Kouwenhoven’s work [4.2]. An interesting point made by Ferris 
[4.1] and later verified by Kouwenhoven is that, if the heart is not damaged and, given 
time to return to normal, successive shocks have no cumulative effect on the 
susceptibility of the heart to fibrillate.
Moreover, Kouwenhoven’s work also verified Dalziel’s analytical derivation of the 
relationship between shock duration and fibrillation threshold current [4.3]. Finally, it is 
important to mention that although Kouwenhoven recorded the body weights of the 
animals, he did not find any correlation between the body weights and the minimum 
fibrillation current. More experimental data was obtained in 1963 from Kiselev A.P.
[4.4] of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences. The latest results were used by Lee 
W.R [4.5] in an extensive study where important conclusions were drawn but which 
also questioned Dalziel’s analysis presented in [4.6].
4.2.2 Dalziel’s work and IEEE approach
In 1968, Dalziel and Lee [4.7], re-evaluated the lethal electric currents and their 
published results were used as the basis for the development of the current IEEE St-80
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[4.8] safety criteria. Figure 4.1 shows the minimum current vs. duration that causes
fibrillation to dogs.
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Figure 4.1: Relation to minimum fibrillating current to shock duration for dogs [4.7]. 
A straight line below all experimental points was derived and given by:
where K is a constant value depending on body weight and T the shock duration . A 
closer examination of the results [4.7] revealed that the minimum current required to 
produce fibrillation is “approximately proportional to the individual’s body weight, not 
only within the single species, dog, but among the larger animals, probably including 
man”. Further studies [4.9] on accidental electrocutions of almost two hundred cases
4-3
showed that 30% of the victims were female and another 26% were persons under the 
age of twenty. Based on these numbers, Dalziel justified his assumption that the body 
weight for the typical victim of electrocution to be at less than 70 kg. However, as 
Dalziel mentioned “there is certainly a case for selecting a most conservative value for 
the body weight for use in evaluating A'(see Equation 4.1) for the electrocution of a 
man” and, therefore, he proposed a value of 50 kg body weight to be accepted as a 
conventional value for the typical victim of electric shock [4.7].
Figure 4.2 shows the 50th percentile points corresponding to both the maximum 
nonfibrillating current and the minimum fibrillating current for various animals in 
relation to body weight.
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Figure 4.2: Relation of fibrillating current to body weight for various animals, 3.00-second shocks 
[4.7].
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From the figure, it can be inferred that the current magnitude necessary to cause 
fibrillation for a given mammal is somewhere between these two 50th percentile lines, 
depending upon body weight.
Hence, the constant K for the electrocution for a man of body weight of 50 kg can be 
deduced from Figure 4.2 to be 116 and 185 for the maximum nonfibrillating current and 
the minimum fibrillating current respectively yielding the following equation:
. 116 to 185 .  0 _ _ , .I  = ---- ~ ~----  for 8.3 ms to 5 s (4.2)
v r
Dalziel concluded that the threshold results of ventricular fibrillation for at least up to 
the 50th percentile follow a normal distribution. However, if the results for any shock 
duration are plotted on a log-probability paper, the skewing that was observed when 
plotting the results on arithmetic probability paper will disappear [4.10].
When Biegelmeier and Lee [4.10] investigated the relationship between the fibrillating 
current and shock duration, they commented on Kouwenhoven’s experiments on dogs, 
that for shock durations from 8.3 ms to 5 s ranging from 8 to 16 kg, the distribution 
curves drawn on log-probability paper resulted in straight lines indicating that the 
current values follow the logarithmic normal distribution. Moreover, according to the 
same authors, the measurements in Ferris experiments [4.1], which were made on 
several large animals including sheep, dogs, calves and pigs, and spanned shock 
durations from 30 ms to 3 s, followed a log-normal distribution. Finally, the same 
conclusions were drawn when Kiselev’s [4.4] experiments with dogs were examined. 
That meant that for a given shock duration, the distribution of the threshold of current to
produce ventricular fibrillation is log-normal with the exception of shock durations of
0.167 s from Kouwenhoven’s experiments that raised questions and required further 
explanation.
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In 1980, Biegelmeier et al. [4.10], described the reasoning behind the phenomenon of 
the Z-shaped current threshold from which the IEC 479 threshold S-curves originated.
As can be seen in Figure 4.3, the probability of fibrillation curve can be represented by 
two straight lines. This observation provided evidence that there are two different 
physiological mechanisms that should be considered; (a) First, if the shock occurs 
during the vulnerable period of the heart cycle, fibrillation will be produced 
immediately and the threshold was also found to be the same as that found for any 
shorter duration shocks that fell during the vulnerable period , (b) Otherwise, if the 
shock starts during diastole, which is the period of relaxation and filling of the
ventricles, a premature heartbeat may be initiated [4.10].
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Figure 4.3: Minimum fibrillating current distribution curve for dogs [4.10].
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If the shock is long enough to fall in the vulnerable period of the second premature beat, 
then the threshold of ventricular fibrillation becomes significantly lower, bearing in 
mind of course that fibrillation can only be caused during the vulnerable period. 
Biegelmeier, staying on the safe side, made the assumption that the shocks would fall 
within the vulnerable period and by combining the results Kouwenhoven [4.2], Lee
[4.5] and Kiselev [4.4] as well, produced the graph of Figure 4.4, showing the minimum 
fibrillating current for 50% fibrillation probability as a function of shock duration.
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Figure 4.4: Threshold of ventricular fibrillation current for dogs (50% probability) for shock 
durations from 833 ms to 60 s [4.10].
As can be seen, for shock durations below 1/3 of the cardiac cycle, the level is constant 
at about 2 A, while for shock durations longer than 6 heart cycles a constant level of 80 
mA is observed.
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A heart rate of 100 per minute was assumed for the calculation of the standard duration 
of the cardiac cycle and the upper level was calculated to be about 1.96A [4.10], 
Moreover, further safety limits were proposed beyond which there would be no danger 
of ventricular fibrillation by setting the lower and upper limit to 50 mA and 500 mA 
respectively, as shown in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Threshold of ventricular fibrillation for men for 50% fibrillating probability and safety 
limit against ventricular fibrillation for men [4.10].
4.2.3 IEC approach
Based on Biegelmeier and Lee’s work [4.10], the IEC Working Group produced a 
report in 1987 [4.11, 4.12] with the thresholds of 5%, 50% and 95% probability of 
fibrillation. Moreover, another curve was added below which no risk of fibrillation
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existed named the S or Safety curve. It is interesting to note the smoothing of the initial 
Z-shaped lines in order to get the S-shaped curves.
The final limits published in IEC 60479 document [4.13] seem to be further lowered, 
especially the Safety curve. These latest fibrillation threshold limits are presented below 
in Figure 4.6, and are currently widely introduced in various standards around the 
world.
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Figure 4.6: Conventional time/current zones of effects of a.c. current (15 Hz to 100 Hz) on persons 
for current path corresponding to left hand to feet J4.13J.
Although the Safety curve (cl) produces rather conservative fibrillation current 
thresholds, it is currently used by EA-TS 41-24 [4.14]. BS 7354 [4.15] and CENELEC 
HD-63751 [4.16] have adopted the c2 curve corresponding to 5% fibrillation 
probability in order to produce allowable touch and step voltage limits. In the case of 
ITU-T K.33 standard [4.17], a distinction is made between typical and severe cases, 
using curves c2 and c, respectively.
4-9
It is interesting to note that the probabilistic criteria proposed in IEC 60479 have been 
used to produce deterministic values of acceptable step and touch voltages. These 
values are usually produced by accepting either the Safety Curve or the 5% Curve as 
thresholds for allowable body currents and at the same time setting the shock duration 
to a value that would be accepted to account for the worst case scenario (usually 200 
ms). The deterministic criteria have served the power industry for years. The basic 
weakness in this approach is that it does not represent the probabilistic nature of power 
flow, load variation, component and human failures [4.18]. Also, this deterministic 
approach left no room for the integration of more recent developments in the assessment 
process, such as the voltage dependence of human body resistance, the multilayer soil 
resistivity and presence studies in various locations within and outside substations. 
Therefore, it is necessary to treat the safety criteria published in IEC 60479 in a way 
that corresponds to the probabilistic nature of ventricular fibrillation and to allow 
integration in a fully quantitative risk assessment process.
4.3 Development of Ventricular Fibrillation Probability Surface: 
Cardiff Probabilistic Model
In this work, IEC 60479 curves of allowable body current (Safety Curve, 5% and 50% 
confidence level), and also the 95% curve provided in the initial report of the working 
group (WG 4) [4.11], were digitised using ‘FindGraph’ software in order to produce 
analytical expressions useful for the development of more flexible safety limits (Figure 
4.7).
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Figure 4.7: Sampling process of the IEC 479-1 curves for the generation of corresponding 
equations.
Using non-linear regression as a curve fitting technique, the following equations were 
obtained to fit data contained in IEC 479-1 curves (see Figure 4.6).
t i
Safety curve cx: IbI = 0.501-e 0286 + 0.039 *et+2 65710 (4.3)
Curve c2: Ib2 = 1.027 • e 0282 + 0.051 • e t+176610 (4.4)
Curve c3: Ib3 = 1.578 e 0316 + 0.08-e1+7 96210,50 (4.5)
Curve c4: Ib4 =3.309 e 0333 +0.151-et+5 461° (4.6)
When examining the difference of body current between c2 (5%) & c3 (50%) and 
between c3 & C4 (95%) for all shock durations, it can be seen that the difference does 
not remain constant. This is illustrated in Figure 4.8 which suggests that the shape of the
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distribution for any of these durations changes, resulting in different distribution 
characteristics each time.
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Figure 4.8: Current magnitude difference between adjacent curves across shock duration.
In order to build a probability surface that would give the allowable body current 
corresponding to a given shock duration and probability of VF, a computer program 
was developed that allows to build a unique distribution for each duration by using the 
values of allowable body current corresponding to 0%, 5%, 50% and 95% probabilities 
as given in Equations (4.3. to 4.6).
For the process of this analysis, a special statistical software was used, namely @Risk
[4.19]. The software allows modelling a variable not only from standard parameters (i.e. 
mean & standard deviation), but also by specifying values for specific percentile 
locations of an input distribution, given that the type of distribution is known. As 
discussed above, the fibrillating current follows a lognormal distribution, and the 5th, 
50th, and 95th percentile values for any shock duration can be calculated from the 
corresponding equations.
For a shock duration of 200 ms, the values of 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile are used to
form the corresponding lognormal distribution. Moreover, the value taken from the
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Safety Curve is used as maximum body current limit where the probability of 
ventricular fibrillation is considered 0%. Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 show respectively 
the corresponding cumulative distribution function (cdf) and the probability density 
function (pdf) that are generated for a shock duration of 200 ms.
Q ig 'R IS K  - D efine D istr ib u tion : B9
Name Cumulative distribution (cdf) of body current
Cell =RiskLoanormAlt(5% .0 .5 5 6 .5 0 % .0 .9 1 7 .9 5 % .1 ,965 .R isk T ru ncate (0 .287 .).R iskN a m ef'C u
Formula mulative distribution (cdf) of bodv current')) h i
■ LognormAlt(5%,0.556,50<
Function Lognorm
Parameters Alternate
5% 0.556
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Figure 4.9: Screenshot of modelling the fibrillating current by a three-point distribution for a given 
shock duration (200 ms).
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Figure 4.10: The probability density function (pdf) of fibrillating current for any shock duration is 
created based on the calculated 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile values.
The generated distributions corresponding to the range of shock durations from 0 to 1 
seconds were combined in order to generate the graph shown in Figure 4.11. As can be 
seen in the figure, for any shock duration and body current magnitude, a probability of 
ventricular fibrillation can be deduced. This allows greater choice from the pre-selected 
Safety, 5% and 50% limits provided in IEC 60479 and therefore, there is greater 
flexibility in integrating the safety criteria in a probabilistic risk assessment. Another 
perspective of the surface can be given from the combination of the pdfs generated for 
the range of shock duration from 0 to 1 s, as shown in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.11: Probability Surface of Ventricular Fibrillation against Body Current and Shock 
Duration.
Body Current. A
Figure 4.12: Surface generated from the combined lognormal distributions.
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4.4 Factors Controlling Safety Limits
In the following sections, a probabilistic risk assessment process will be developed, 
where the latest advances concerning the accidental circuit and shock circumstances 
will be integrated in the process in order to develop a better understanding and create a 
more comprehensive description of the system. The next sections of this chapter are 
dedicated to examining some of these key points that are concerned with the safety 
limits and showing the steps taken in order to be included in the risk assessment 
process.
4.4.1 Heart-Current Factor
The time/current zones of a.c. currents effects, shown in Figure 4.6, correspond to a 
current path from left hand to feet. In order to calculate the current for a different 
current path that would have the same danger of ventricular fibrillation as the reference 
current, a heart current factor (F) was proposed [4.13].
The heart current factor represents an approximate estimate of the density of the current 
passing through the heart for various current path-ways, and for any of these paths, the 
corresponding current is given by:
Where
Iref is the body current for the path left hand to feet given in Figure 4.6. 
Ih is the body current for paths given in Table 4.1.
F is the heart-current factor given in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Heart-current factor F for different current paths [4.13].
Current Path Heart-current factor F
Left hand to left foot, right foot, or both feet 1.0
Both hands to both feet 1.0
Left hand to right hand 0.4
Right hand to left foot, right foot or both feet 0.8
Back to right hand 0.3
Back to left hand 0.7
Chest to right hand 1.3
Chest to left hand 1.5
Seat to left hand, right hand or to both hands 0.7
Left foot to right foot 0.04
It should be noted that the “left foot to right foot” current path was added to the latest 
version of IEC 60479 [4.13]. Based on the fact that for this current path, the main body 
current misses the heart, the heart factor was calculated to be 0.04, which results in 
allowable step voltages twenty five times higher than before.
4.4.2 Modelling of Human Body Impedance
The total impedance of human body (Zr ) consists of resistive and capacitive 
components. This impedance depends on the touch voltage, the current frequency, the 
degree of moisture of the skin, the current path and the surface area of contact. IEC 
60479-1 [4.13] provides values as a function of these parameters. However, for high 
touch voltages, the total impedance becomes less dependent on the skin impedance. IEC 
60479-1, by adopting a conservative approach for the human body impedance 
dependence on touch voltage, provides values of body impedance for a current path
hand to hand, for large surface areas of contact (5000 mm2 to 10000mm2) and dry 
conditions [4.13].
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These values, shown in Figure 4.13, were used to derive empirical equations to express 
this dependence.
7 00 0
5000
g. 4 0 0 0
2000
1000
2000 3 0 0 0  
T o u ch  V o lta g e , V
60001000 4 0 0 0 5000
5% of the population —  50% of the population 95%  of the population
Figure 4.13: Total body impedances for a current path hand to hand for large surface areas of 
contact in dry conditions (a.c. 50/60 Hz) [4.13].
In this work, the following empirical equations for body impedances Zfl(5%), Zs(50%) and
' B (95%) corresponding to 5%, 50% and 95% of the population respectively were
derived:
(4.8)
(4.9) 
(4.10)
Although these probabilistic values have been published in IEC standards, in practice a 
single value of body impedance was often used by earthing standards e.g. BS 7354, TS 
41-24, ITU-T K.33 and IEEE st-80 use 1000 Q for body impedance. As can be seen in
z b(5%) = 1 -4"  103 ' 641.47
Za(50%) = 3.053 • 103 ■ 870.96
ZB(95%| = 6.228• 103 • + i 176
4-18
Figure 4.13, the impedance can be as high as 6000 Q for lower touch voltages, which 
suggests that a rather conservative limit is created as far as the allowable touch voltages 
are concerned. On the other hand, for higher touch voltages (above 1000 V), 50% of the 
population is expected to have 775 Q body impedance, while for another 5% of the 
population, the body impedance will be as low as 575 Q. In this case, the current 
flowing through the human body for a given touch voltage will be underestimated when 
using the 1000Q value, which arises safety issues.
Here, the body impedance was modelled using Equations (4.8) to (4.10) and the 
prospective touch voltage to build a lognormal distribution with the use of specialised 
software @Risk. A screenshot of this procedure is shown in Figure 4.14 for a touch 
voltage of 500 V .
^ J S J x l
Name C um ulative distribution fuction (cdf) o f body im p e d a n c e H I
Cell l=R iskl_oanorm A lt(5% .625.50% .850.95% .11 5 0 .R isk N a m e ("Cumulative distribution
Formula fuction (cdf) o f bodv im oedance")) |
. LognormAlt(5%, 625, 50%.
Function Lognorm ▼
Parameters Alternate
5% 625
50% 850
95% 1150
l i J B l - ^ l
Add Overlay
Cumulative distribution fuction (cdf) of body impedance
0.625 1.150
1.0
0.8
tfo.6
X)m
■§ 0.4 - 
CL
0.2
0.0
5.0%
CMO VO CO co o —
Body Impedance (ft) 
Values in Thousands
0 ] j # | B |  A l l D j f U <J ►] OK Close
Figure 4.14: Development of cumulative distribution function (cdf) of body impedance for a 500 V 
corresponding touch voltage.
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This process is repeated for the whole range of values between OV and 5000V. In this 
way, the generated distribution takes into consideration the voltage dependence and 
statistical deviation for any touch voltage.
4.4.3 Effect of current path on body impedance
In Figure 4.15, it can be seen that the total body impedance ( ZT), consists of the 
internal impedance as well as the impedance of the skin, where Zf is the internal body 
impedance and Zsx, ZS2 are the skin impedances.
Figure 4.15: Impedances of human body [4.13].
The internal impedance of the human body involved in an electrocution scenario is 
dependent on the path that the current follows through the human body. IEC 60479-1 
[4.13] provides a representation of the human body, as shown in Figure 4.16 where the 
percentage of the internal impedance of the human body is given for the part of the body 
concerned, in relation to the path hand to foot [4.13].
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Figure 4.16: Percentage of the internal impedance of the human body [4.13].
Since, the values of body impedance against touch voltage in Figure 4.13 correspond to 
a current path from hand to hand, the standard suggests that a factor of 0 . 8  can be 
applied to these values in order to calculate the hand to foot body impedance. The 
standard notes that, for living humans, the statistical values provided for body 
impedance apply to shock duration of about 0.1 s. However, as it will be seen later in 
Chapter 5, from the statistical analysis of fault clearance data, a significant amount of 
faults are expected to be cleared well above this duration. In such cases, a reduction of 
10% to 20% of body impedance is recommended [4.13]. The following diagram of 
Figure 4.17 summarizes the developed modelling process of the body impedance.
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Decrease body 
impedance 1 0 % to 2 0  %
For a given Touch 
Voltage (VT)
Selection of current path depending 
on electrocution scenario
Calculation of ZT according to Equations 
(4.8,4.9,4.10) for current path hand to hand
Calculation of body impedance for 
the specific part of body including 
skin impedance
Application of 0.8 reduction factor to adapt 
value to current path from hand to foot
Development of corresponding lognormal distribution 
and random selection of body impedance
Figure 4.17: Developed Modelling Process o f Total Body Impedance.
The total body impedances for different paths have been calculated as percentages of 
the body impedance for current path hand to foot, and are shown in Table 4.2. 
Moreover, the heart-current factor (F) for the same path was considered.
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Table 4.2: Possible current paths and corresponding heart-current factors and body impedances.
Current Paths Heart-current factor (F)
Body impedance as 
proportion of hand to foot 
body impedance
Left hand to left foot 1 1
Left hand to right foot 1 1
Right hand to left foot 0 . 8 1
Right hand to right foot 0 . 8 1
Left hand to right hand 0.4 0 . 8
Right hand to both feet 0 . 8 0.75
Left hand to both feet 1 0.75
Both hands to both feet 1 0.5
Seat to left hand 0.7 0.56
Seat to right hand 0.7 0.56
Seat to both hands 0.7 0.33
Back to right hand 0.3 0.52
Back to left hand 0.7 0.52
Chest to right hand 1.3 0.52
Chest to left hand 1.5 0.52
Left foot to right foot 0.04 0.275
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, IEC 60479 tolerable body current curves have been analysed and further 
developed to obtain surface probability curves. This surface probability will allow more 
accurate assessment of risk compared with the approach using the conventional ci, C2 
and C3 curves of the original IEC recommendations. Moreover, a procedure to obtain a 
surface probability for ventricular fibrillation was developed. This procedure takes into 
account current magnitude and path, and shock duration. The body impedance was also 
modelled based on its voltage and time dependency as well as accounting for the current 
path through the body. The various additional resistances as seen in the previous chapter 
such as footwear and contact resistance complete the accidental circuit giving a model 
as close as possible to real life conditions.
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The next chapter deals with the probabilistic parameters of the system and the 
conditions under which a fault may occur based on system fault historical data. The 
study aims to show the statistical deviation of faults from the worst case scenario and to 
represent the fault parameters in a way closer to real system conditions.
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF LONG TERM SYSTEM 
FAULT DATA FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, the various deterministic approaches to risk assessment and the generation 
of safety limits were studied and compared with the aim of showing that the safety 
limits created do not fully correspond to the probabilistic nature of the load, protection 
system and grid characteristics.
In this chapter, such contributing parameters (e.g. clearance time) will be addressed in 
detail, based on data provided from the UK transmission company (National Grid). 
These parameters were modelled so that they can be used in the suggested probabilistic 
risk assessment methodology that follows in Chapter 7. Moreover, through the data 
analysis, the correlation of the various parameters with the imposed risk levels and the 
implications when using a worst case scenario value will be shown.
The purpose of this study is to support a risk assessment methodology that will allow 
practising engineers to make the most cost effective decisions based not only on 
historical data but also on their personal experience and local knowledge of the site.
5.2 Fault Clearance Time
5.2.1 System Requirements
The Grid Code [5.1] describes the operating procedures and principles governing 
National Grid’s relationship with all users of the GB Transmission System. According 
to this document, “the fault clearance time for faults on the Generator’s or DC 
Converter Station owner’s equipment directly connected to the GB Transmission 
System and for faults on the GB Transmission System directly connected to the
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Generator or DC Converter Station owner’s equipment, from fault inception to the 
circuit breaker arc extinction, shall be set out in accordance with the Bilateral 
Agreement”. The times specified in the agreement cannot be faster than:
• 80 ms at 400 kV
• 100 ms at 275 kV
• 120 ms at 132 kV and below
However, it is clarified that the above times are maximum values, and users or NG if 
possible should always aim for faster fault clearance times. Also, slower fault clearance 
times can be agreed for faults on the GB Transmission System. Finally, the circuit 
breaker fail protection is required to initiate tripping of all the necessary electrically 
adjacent circuit breakers targeting to interrupt the fault current within the next 200 ms. 
However, slower fault clearance times that do not exceed 300 ms can only be accepted 
in cases where the faults occur on the Network Operator’s or Non-Embedded 
Customer’s apparatus [5.1].
According to a technical specification [5.2] by National Grid addressed to external 
companies/users of the Transmission System, plant and equipment should be suitable 
for operation under the conditions provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Target Fault Clearance Requirements [5.2].
Nominal Voltage 
(kV)
Target fault 
interruption time 
of main in-feeding 
circuit (ms)
Target total fault 
clearance time (all 
infeeds) (ms)
Target back-up 
clearance time 
(ms)
400 80 140 500
275 100 160 500
132 120 N/A <1500
13 75 N/A N/A
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The document also states that in the event of a circuit-breaker failure, circuit-breaker 
fail protection shall trip all necessary contiguous circuit-breakers, capable of supplying 
a fault infeed, within a target fault clearance time not exceeding 300 ms.
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, the first peak of the decaying ac component after contact 
separation will be the largest during the arcing period. The Peak Break is the highest 
instantaneous short circuit current that the circuit breaker has to extinguish.
Peak
Make
Peak
Break
Short
Circuit
Current
(kA)
Time (ms)
Protection
Time
Contact
Separation
Fault
Clearance
Break
Time
Figure 5.1: Resultant Short Circuit Current [5.3].
The Peak Break current will be significantly higher than the RMS Break shown in 
Figure 5.2, because like the Peak Make current, it is an instantaneous value and it also 
includes the DC component [5.3].
Moreover, the RMS Break current and the Peak Break current will depend on the break 
time because for slower protection, the break time is longer. The Seven Year Statement 
demands a uniform break time of 50 ms to be applied at all sites. It also states that 
“...for the majority of our circuit breakers, this is a fair or pessimistic assumption. In
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this context, it should be noted that the break time of 50 ms is the time to the first major 
peak in the arcing period, rather than the time to arc extinction” [5.3].
RMS
Break
Short
Circuit
Current
(WJ Time (ms)
Contact
Separation
Protection
Time
Tault
Clearance
Figure 5.2: AC Component of Short Circuit Current [53].
The fault clearance time is the sum of the protection time and the contact separation 
period. In the Seven Year Statement [5.3], the NG circuit breaker indicative ratings are 
provided including the Break Time. From the data, it is evident that, at many sites, a 
combination of different types of circuit breakers is installed within a single substation, 
resulting in a range of ratings for these substations. In general, the substation 
infrastructure will have a rating very close to the associated circuit breaker.
5.2.2 System Fault Data for the Period 1993-2003
Fault data was made available by National Grid for the investigations undertaken in this 
project. In this investigation, the above circuit breaker ratings were compared with the 
averages of fault clearance times recorded over a ten year period from 1993 to 2003.
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This is achieved by comparing the system fault data supplied by NG with specifications 
for substation equipment contained in the 7 Year Statement. As mentioned above, the 
majority of circuit breakers are rated at 50 ms with fewer examples of 30 or 70 ms. 
Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 show the measured average clearance times of various 
substations for the 275 kV and 400 kV circuits respectively.
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Figure 5.3 : Average fault clearance times at affected substations (275 kV) against circuit breaker ratings.
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Figure 5.4: Average fault clearance times at affected substations (400 kV) against circuit breaker ratings.
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Analysis of the system fault data has shown that the average fault clearance time for 
both the 275 kV and the 400 kV circuits is found to be around 80 ms. The Seven Year 
Statement data shows that the large majority of CB have a break time rating of 50 ms, 
which suggests that the contact separation period could be averaged to an additional 30 
ms i.e. one and a half cycle later for the 50 Hz AC operating current.
A closer examination of the system fault data is necessary to draw conclusions on an 
appropriate selection of a clearance time to be used in the risk assessment studies. Fault 
records are provided by NG for both the 275 kV and the 400 kV circuits over the period 
1993 to 2003 and are presented in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6.
For the 275 kV circuits, a total of 317 recordings give an average of 86 ms with the 
clearance times ranging from 40 ms to 250 ms. Figure 5.7 provides the distribution of 
clearance times. Figure 5.8 represents the cumulative probability of clearance time 
obtained from the data, and it is worth noting here that 99% of the faults were cleared 
within the first 146 ms.
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Figure 5.5: Recorded Fault Clearance Times for 275 kV Circuits.
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Figure 5.6: Recorded Fault Clearance Times for 400 kV Circuits.
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Figure 5.7: Fault Clearance Times for 275 kV Circuits.
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Figure 5.8: Cumulative Distribution Function (cdf) of 275 kV Fault Clearance Times.
For the 400 kV system, there were 886 recordings over the ten year period, and these 
give an average of 80 ms. As can be seen from the histogram of Figure 5.9, the 
clearance times range from 40 to 390 ms in this case. There is a very small number of 
clearance times less than 30 ms for both the 275 kV and 400 kV systems, and these 
were attributed by National Grid engineers to testing and hence should be discarded. 
They have very little effect on the calculated average clearance time. Apart from the 
very short-time recordings, there were also a total of five recordings that ranged from 1 
up to 10 minutes. These were either very extreme cases of circuit breaker failure or else 
malfunction of the recording system, and therefore, were also removed from the list. 
The cumulative distribution of Figure 5.10 shows that 99% of the faults were cleared 
within 146 ms on the National Grid 400 kV transmission system. The histogram of 
Figure 5.11 shows the clearance times recorded for the 400 kV and 275 kV circuits. The 
data have been filtered from values that were attributed to false recording or circuit
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breaker testing, and the appropriate distribution was examined with @Risk 4.5 software 
[5.4].
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Figure 5.9: Fault Clearance Times for 400 kV Circuits
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Figure 5.10: Cumulative Distribution Function (cdf) of 400 kV Fault Clearance Times.
5-11
0.0500 0.1300
5.0%
5.1%
Input
Minimum 0.0300
Maximum 0.3900
Mean 0.0822
Std Dev 0.0279
Values
h h  C a m r
1203
na
Minimum 0.0300
Maximum + 00
Mean 0.0823
Std Dev 0.0256
Fault Clearance Time (s)
Figure 5.11: Fault Clearance Times Histogram and Fitted Distribution.
Currently, National Grid uses a clearance time of 200 ms for the purpose of risk 
assessment studies. However, the system indicates that a very small number of 
recordings reach or exceed this value. Although 200 ms clearance time guarantees 
safety of the system, it can lead to quite conservative results regarding the design of the 
earthing system, and consequently, can inflate installation costs significantly. It is, 
therefore, suggested that the clearance time should be representative of the recorded 
system clearance times under real fault conditions. A statistical analysis would allow to 
achieve a more realistic and cost-effective solution.
The histograms of Figure 5.12 and 5.13 show the clearance times over a ten year period 
for the different individual circuits of the 275 and 400 kV systems. As can be seen, the 
average value of clearance times in the North-West England circuits is 83 ms, while it is 
98 ms for the Pembroke circuits. This could be explained by the circuit breakers 
installed on the Pembroke circuits being of earlier technology which results in higher
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clearance times. For this reason, it is proposed to consider the use of different profiles of 
clearance time depending on the technology of the circuit that is being examined. 
However, currently there is not enough data for all different substations nationwide, to 
draw a statistical inference. In the suggested process, the data from all different circuits 
are used in order to build a distribution (see Figure 5.11) which provides a national 
profile of the expected fault clearance times.
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Figure 5.12: North-West England Circuits
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Figure 5.13: Pembroke Circuits
5.3 F ault C a u s e s  a n d  G eo g ra p h ica l L o c a tio n
The National Grid fault data also includes the cause of each fault for the ten year period 
from 1993 to 2003 which are briefly summarised below. As can be seen on Figure 5.14, 
for the 275 kV system, 43% of the faults are due to lightning, another 39% are weather 
related, 3% because of third party damages to cables and overhead lines, 15% of the 
faults are attributed to ‘other’causes which include pollution (especially in urban and 
coastal areas), ageing, electronic faults, fires close to the lines, faulty manufacture of
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equipment, bird nests on overhead lines (OHL), failure of cables, demolition of nearby 
buildings or even cranes touching OHL.
Other
Lightning
43%
Weather
39%
□ Lightning □ Weather □ 3rd Party □ Other 
Figure 5.14: Fault Causes on the 275 kV System.
The statistics for the 400 kV system are quite similar to those of the 275 kV system with 
45% of faults caused because by lightning, 37% due to bad weather and 8% due to other 
reasons. The number of faults on the 400 kV system is almost three times higher than on 
the 275 kV system, with pollution and ageing claiming 7% and 3% respectively, as it 
can be observed on Figure 5.15.
Ageing
3% 0ther 
8%
Pollution
7% . Lightning
45%
Weather
37%
□ Lightning ■ Weather □ Pollution □ Ageing ■ Other
Figure 5.15: Fault Causes on the 400 kV System.
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The data, as shown in Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 indicates clearly that the effect of 
lightning is a major parameter when determining the probability of EPR and focusing 
on a local area to perform a risk assessment on a specific circuit at a substation. The 
British standard for protection of structures against lightning [5.5] provides a map with 
the lightning flash density (Ng ) per square kilometre per year for Britain as shown in
Appendix A. It can be seen from the map that the lightning activity varies and that the 
Eastern and Southern areas more affected than Western and Northern areas. From the 
data accumulated over ten years there is a variation of roughly 2 to 1 between the 
different areas of Britain.
The 275 and 400 kV fault data were graphically mapped onto the maps of Figure 5.16 
and Figure 5.17 to show the fault locations on the 275 kV and 400 kV transmission 
network respectively. This graphical representation of faults has shown that the faults 
are not evenly distributed but there are areas where the circuits are more prone to faults. 
Such areas are usually coastal areas or areas where severe weather conditions occur 
more often. For example, on the Pembroke-Swansea North and the Heysham- 
Penwortham-Huton circuits, a large number of faults has occurred while circuits like 
Indian Queens-Alverdiscott seem not to have suffered any faults over a 10 year period. 
Moreover, transmission lines such Enderby to East Claydon suffer a greater number of 
faults because of the length of the line and its exposure to a number of extreme and 
unforeseen weather conditions.
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Figure 5.16: Graphical Representation of Faults Recorded from 1993 to 2003 for 275 kV Circuits.
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5.4 F ault F re q u e n c y
Substations with more incoming/outgoing lines and cables, and larger numbers of 
equipment are expected to be more prone to faults [5.6, 5.7]. The information in the 
available fault data for the period 1993-2003 includes the affected circuit and the cause 
of each fault. However, the exact location of the fault is not specified. Hence, although 
the cause can be, for example, lightning or ageing, the exact location of the fault, 
whether it took place on an overhead line or inside the substation, was not recorded. 
However, since almost 80% of the faults are caused by lightning and extreme weather 
conditions, it can be assumed that the majority of the faults take place on the overhead 
lines that are exposed to such conditions.
A National Grid technical report, describing the transmission system fault performance
[5.8], provided supplementary data shown in Appendix B for the three year period 1997 
to 2000. This data, graphically presented on Figure 5.18, indicates that from a total of 
564 faults over the three year period, 453 faults took place on overhead lines and cables. 
As can be seen on the pie chart of Figure 5.18, these faults cover 81% of the total 
faults, followed by an 11% of faults on transformers and reactor circuits, and the 
remaining faults being either on busbars, other plants or unknown to NG.
2% 5% 1%
□ Overhead line & Cable ■ Transformer & Reactor Circuits
□ Busbars □  Other Plant
■ Unknown or external to NG
Figure 5.18: Location of Faults on the Transmission System (data from [5.8J).
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Assuming that there are about 250 substations interconnected by 15000 km of overhead 
lines and 500 km of underground cables and that each substation contains on average 6 
equipment bays [5.7, 5.9], the fault rate per substation bay is:
12 1 1
111x —  x —— x — « 0.025 faults per substation bay per year. (1 every 40 years)
36 250 6
The fault rate per overhead line is calculated for the first 5 km of the circuit that can
cause rise o f earth potential at the substation, and is estimated to:
12 5433 x —  x  « 0.05 faults per line end per year. (1 every 20 years)36 15000 j j >
Similarly, the fault rate for cables is estimated for the first 5 km of the circuit and is:
12 520 x —  x  = 0.06 faults per cable end per year (1 every 15 years)
36 500
The total fault rate of a substation is calculated using Equation (5.1):
/  = 0.05 L + 0.06C + 0.025B (5.1)
where L is the number of line ends, C is the number of cable ends and B is the number 
of switchgear bays. Although some 90% of the total faults occurring in a year can be 
classified as earth faults [5.10], it is estimated that only 25% to 50% will result in 
significant current flow [5.9].
5.5 Seasonal Dependence of Faults
Since a large number of faults are due to weather and lightning, it is worth considering 
the seasonal variation of faults on the system which will have an effect on safety 
assessment.
Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20 show the distribution of faults due to weather and lightning 
throughout the year, for the 275 kV and the 400 kV systems respectively. Although the 
failure rate (Probability of EPR) is calculated on an annual basis i.e. faults per year, it is
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worth noting that, during the autumn months, the percentage of faults due to 
lightning/weather is low.
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Figure 5.19: Seasonal Dependence of Weather & Lightning Faults on 275 kV Systems.
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Figure 5.20: Seasonal Dependence of Weather & Lightning Faults on 400 kV Systems.
However, during the summer months, the highest lightning activity takes place, hence 
most lightning faults occur. Therefore, the application of a constant failure rate
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throughout the year, and hence, of a constant probability of rise of earth potential as 
described in Section 5.4, may be considered as an over optimistic estimate for those 
months of the year that are more heavily affected by lightning and could raise safety 
concerns. However, this approach remains in the safe side if it is assumed that no work 
is performed under bad weather conditions. As a matter of fact, according to National 
Gnd practice, testing or maintenance work is carried out only if the weather forecast 
predicts no lightning risk.
5.6 Fault Current Magnitude
5.6.1 Calculation of Fault Current
In the event o f a fault and the failure of the insulation of a conductor to earth on a high 
voltage system, the fault current or a proportion of it, will flow through the earth and 
return to the neutral point(s) of the supply transformers). As a result, the fault current 
will run through the substation earth electrode system resulting in a rise of the earth 
potential [5.11, 5.12].
In a three-phase a.c. system, the magnitude of a short-circuit current depends on various 
parameters. At any location in the system, the fault current magnitude depends mainly 
on the network configuration, the generators in operation and, of course, on the 
operational state of the network before the short circuit. These parameters in a system 
vary significantly, and it is extremely difficult to specify the special load flow 
conditions that could result in either a maximum or a minimum short-circuit current at 
the various locations of the system [5.13, 5.14].
In order to calculate the fault levels, a simplified calculation methodology was 
developed and was published in the International Standard IEC909 “Short-Circuit 
Calculation in three-phase a.c. systems”. British Standard BS 7639 follows this
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methodology [5.3, 5.14, 5.15]. This analytical methodology is very conservative, and 
could lead to increased investment for earthing.
Engineering Recommendation G74 [5.16] allows three-phase to earth and single phase 
to earth short circuit analyses to be computed more accurately, and these are published 
in the Seven Year Statement [5.3].
5.6.2 Effect of Fault Locations on Fault Current Magnitude
As seen in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, almost 80% of all faults on the NG transmission system 
are caused by lightning and bad weather conditions, and most of these affect overhead 
lines. Hence, it is o f importance to calculate the fault current of these faults either using 
analytical methods [5.17, 5.18] or simulation software.
High-voltage systems have an effectively grounded neutral. In this case, when a ground 
fault occurs on an overhead transmission line, the fault current returns to the grounded 
neutral through the tower structure, ground return paths and ground wires [5.19].
It is usually assumed that the impedance of the fault-arc itself is very small and 
negligible in comparison with other impedances in the circuit. Consequently, it is 
usually not taken into account in practice. However, the fault-impedance includes the 
resistance of tower-footing and (if applicable) the contact resistance between fallen 
conductors and earth [5.13].
Overhead line impedances can be readily calculated from the line dimensions or they 
are provided from look up tables for already operational networks [5.3]. Also, tables 
provide approximate values of the ratio of zero sequence impedance. If only 
approximate results are required, or if the impedance of the overhead line is small 
compared with other impedances in the circuit, the values given in such tables can be 
used. Alternatively, the actual zero-sequence impedance of the line or lines should be 
determined by testing or by calculation.
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In parallel conductors, such as overhead line earth wires and cable sheaths/armours, 
substantial induced currents can flow when the associated circuit phase conductors carry 
earth fault currents. This current returns to the source without entering the ground, so it 
does not cause any rise o f earth potential.
For an overhead line with a single earth wire and with the circuit long enough so that 
the combined value of the terminal earthing resistances at each end of the line is small 
compared to the earth wire impedance (Zs ), a good approximation of the current 
returning to the ground (7^)is given by:
(5.1)
and k = (5.2)
V * *  j
where zmp s is the mutual impedance between line conductor and earth wire (Q / km) , 
and z s is the earth wire impedance (Q / km).
Table 5.2 provides magnitudes o f current returning to ground (I gr) as a percentage of
the fault current ( I r ) and phase angle with respect to (7r) ,  for most overhead line 
circuits which operate at 132 kV, 275 kV and 400 kV [5.11].
Table 5.2: Values o f ground current {I gr ) as a percentage of (7r ) and corresponding phase angle 
Qgr [5.1U.
Type of Line and 
Conductor Size {mm2)
I  gr as a percentage 
of I r
Phase Angle of I gr with respect to 
I r (O^. degrees lead)
132 kV (L4) 
(1x175) 70.8 171
132 kV (L7) 
(2x175) 63.6 177
275 kV (L3) 
(2x175) 66.9 178
275 kV (L2) 
(2x400) 68.6 178
400 kV (L8) 
(2x400) 70.0 179
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400 kV (L6) 
(4x400) 69.2 179
400 kV (L9) 
(4x400) 64.0 179
In this section, the results of an investigation of the effect of fault location on fault 
current magnitude for a long transmission line are presented. The study includes fault 
current simulations on a small network using NEPLAN software. An eight node generic 
network with double circuit lines was used to investigate the effect of fault location on 
fault current distribution. Figure 5.21 shows a line diagram of the simulated network.
Figure 5.21: Model of the Simulated C ircu it
The transmission line and power station characteristics were taken from the Seven Year 
Statement of National Grid. The line under investigation is named EL3 and has a length 
of 168 km located between Node 3 and Node 4. Figure 5.22 shows the computed 
current magnitude along the line.
As can be seen, the minimum fault current is obtained when the fault occurs at mid-line. 
The difference between minimum and maximum possible fault currents can be as high
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as 41%. However, for shorter transmission lines, the difference is less significant. For a 
40 km transmission line, only 25% is computed (Figure 5.23).
<  30
2 0  4 0  60  80
% D istance o f  F ault L ocation  from N3 in the direction  
to w a rd s  N4
100
Figure 5.22: Fault current against fault location on a transmission line.
60
40
20
100604 020
% Distance o f  F ault L ocation  from N2 in the direction  
to w a rd s N3
Figure 5.23: Fault current against fault location on a transmission line.
Such observation suggests that for a full risk assessment of two neighbouring 
substations, the dependence of fault current magnitude on line length and fault location 
can play a significant role. Therefore, taking into account the statistical variability of
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fault location [5.20] coupled with modelling Extreme-Weather-Related Transmission 
Line Outages [5.21] would allow more representative risk assessment on the earthing 
system of transmission systems.
5.6.3 Effect of Load Conditions on Fault Current Magnitude
As mentioned before, the magnitude of fault current in a three-phase a.c. system at any 
location depends on various parameters, such as the network configuration, the 
generators or power-station units and the motors in operation and, of course, on the 
operational state of the network before the short circuit. Currently, Engineering 
Recommendation G74 [5.16] based on a computerised method is used to calculate the 
maximum fault current, taking into account the worst case scenario and, consequently, 
by using maximum load conditions for the system.
Recorded data of the demand of Great Britain [5.22] for the year 2003-2004 is shown in 
Figure 5.24. The demand varies significantly even within the same day but also there is 
a trend for the demand to decrease during the spring and summer. The purpose of this 
study is to use the recorded faults provided by National Grid and the published load 
conditions during the same period, in order to assess the fault current level.
70000 
|  60000 
^  50000 
|  40000 
c  30000
u  20000 
o 10000
Maximum Load Conditions Minimum Load Conditions Average Load Conditions
Figure 5.24: Great Britain Demand for 2003-2004 (MW) (data source (5.22J).
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Unfortunately, the exact time of the fault was not recorded. Therefore, the fault current 
was calculated for the maximum value of load within a particular month. It is, therefore, 
expected that the fault current magnitude will increase with network configuration, 
which may be affected with load conditions. Here, the annual changes of demand were 
neglected. Combining the data shown in Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20 with the demand 
data of Figure 5.24, the number of faults per month with the corresponding load 
conditions when the faults occurred, are shown on Figure 5.25.
* 10 
Months of the Year
Figure 5.25: Total faults against maximum load conditions per calendar month.
Figure 5.25 shows that only 16% of the faults occur under maximum load conditions
generating maximum fault current, and these faults occur in December. However, 53%
of all faults, which occur during spring and summer months are expected to have fault
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currents that are at least 25% lower compared with the maximum possible magnitude. 
In summary, because of the variability during the month and even the day, it is expected 
that only a very small percentage of the recorded faults would actually generate 
maximum fault current magnitude as used in current practice.
In a probabilistic risk assessment, the worst case scenarios i.e. maximum load condition 
will be included in the assessment but with its frequency of appearance in practice. In 
the proposed probabilistic risk assessment process described in Chapter 7, the fault 
current for a particular circuit varies between a maximum and a minimum magnitude 
following a uniform distribution.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, an extensive analysis o f the various parameters (e.g. clearance time, 
fault location, load conditions) contributing to risk assessment, based on data provided 
from the UK main transmission company was carried out, and the correlation of these 
parameters with the imposed risk levels and the implications when using worst case 
scenario were investigated. The analysis has shown that the current practice of adopting 
200 ms as fault clearance time is conservative since the average for both 275 kV and 
400 kV systems is 80 ms and 99% of faults for a ten year period were cleared within 
146 ms. A distribution corresponding to the recorded time was developed which will be 
integrated in the proposed risk assessment process of Chapter 7. Moreover, the 
variability of fault frequency and time with location and season were addressed, and 
circuits with higher exposure to severe weather conditions are shown to suffer more 
faults while circuits with higher fault clearance times were linked to protection systems 
of earlier technology. Also, the fault current magnitude was investigated in relation to 
location of fault on the transmission line and load conditions of the system. The study 
showed that only a very small number of faults actually occurred under maximum fault
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conditions. Finally, by simulating a generic network, it was found the fault current can 
vary by up to 40% depending on the location of faults on the transmission line, which 
account for 80% of the total faults.
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CHAPTER 6. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW RISK 
ASSESSM ENT PROCEDURE: THE CARDIFF RISK 
ASSESSM ENT FACILITY FOR TRANSMISSION 
SYSTEMS (CRAFTS)
6.1 Introduction
Having examined the various factors that govern earthing systems and their safety, it 
was realised that Risk Assessment of earthing systems is still in need of further 
development and structuring. In this chapter, a new approach is developed to facilitate 
such investigations and help engineers and asset managers to make informed decisions 
with regards to safety o f earthing systems. Within the time of this thesis, the extensive 
background to safety requirements and parameters on electrical systems was explored in 
detail which allowed a clear vision of the process to be developed. This is now 
implemented through the development of a computerised routine for risk assessment. 
The developed software problem named Cardiff Risk Assessment Facility for 
Transmission Systems and referred to here as CRAFTS is already a significant 
improvement on existing practice. Further refinement of the probabilistic assessment is 
proposed in Chapter 7.
In this chapter, the developed CRAFTS program is presented. It performs probabilistic 
risk assessment and integrates the latest developments of the relevant standards [6.1- 
6.4]. The Interface was built using Matlab V 7.0 and is a standalone application. The 
aim was to create a user friendly tool which would allow engineers to either perform 
analytical calculations on the earthing system or use simulation results to conduct a risk 
assessment of the site.
Following discussion with engineers from the sponsoring companies, it was agreed that 
the analytical calculations of the earthing system characteristics would comply with
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British Standard BS 7354:1990 recommendations [6.1]. In addition, the software 
incorporates all the latest international developments adopted by IEC 60479 standard 
[6.4] concerning the accidental circuit, as well as the probability surface of ventricular 
fibrillation as developed in Chapter 4.
6.2 Capabilities of Developed CRAFTS program.
CRAFTS performs the following calculations and safety assessments:
•  Analytical calculation of Earth Resistance of Grid, Earth Wire Chain Impedance 
and Earth Impedance o f Cable Sheath based on BS 7354 [6.1].
• Calculation of EPR based on earth fault current distribution in overhead lines 
and cables according to BS 7354 [6.1].
• Calculation of prospective Touch/Step voltages in case of earth fault.
• Calculation of Body Impedance taking into consideration its voltage dependence 
and current path according to IEC 60479 [6.4].
• Allows for the inclusion of additional resistances in the calculation such as
contact resistance, footwear and gloves.
• Calculation of allowable Touch/Step voltages based on the IEC 60479 curves of 
allowable body current, taking into consideration the current path and associated 
heart factor.
• Determines whether the step and touch voltages generated by fault currents are 
safe or not.
• Allows a second stage safety assessment performed through probabilistic risk 
assessment.
• Finally, determines whether the individual risk is acceptable by comparing it 
against the ALARP criteria.
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6.3 To ta l E a rth in g  Im p e d a n c e
The total earth impedance is further reduced when the overhead line earth wires and the 
earthed cable sheaths are connected to the grid. The approximate equations described in 
BS 7354 [6.1] are used to calculate the grid resistance, the chain impedance of lines and 
the impedance of cable sheaths. The total impedance is given by:
ZT = 1 _i_ 1 1 1_i_ ____ 1_1_ 11
R
T
U u " X ,
1 7 z c._
-i
(6.1)
Where: R is the resistance of grid to earth (£T)
Z L is the line earthwire chain impedance to earth (H)
Zc is the cable sheath impedance to earth (Q)
Figure 6.1 shows the dialog box for the calculation of the substation earth impedance.
Total Earthing knpedance
Earth Resistance of Grid (O)
□  Rg to BS 7354 
| □  Alternative Value
Earth Chain knpedance of Lines Connected to Grid (O)
□  Equivalent Zl to BS 7354 
0  Alternative 21 Value
Earth knpedance of Cable Sheath Connected to Grid(0)
0  Equivalent Zc to BS 7354 
0  Alternative Zc Value
Substation Earth Impedance (0)
Figure 6.1: Input and Calculated Substation Total Earthing Impedance.
For each of these impedances the option to use alternative values is also provided which 
may come from experimental measurements or simulation.
6.3.1 Earth R esistance of Grid
The electrode resistance is given by the following equation:
R = p*
1 +
r  + 2.5/i)  1—+ —
8 rKl
(6.2)
Where: p  is the soil resistivity (Qm)
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r is the equivalent circular plate radius (m) given from r GridArea ( 6 .3 )
h is the depth of burial of grid (m)
L is the total length of buried grid conductors
K r is a constant which is dependent on number, position and length of earth rods
Where: nR is the total effective number of rods and lR is the length of the earth rods 
(m). Figure 6.2 shows the dialog box for the analytical calculation of the grid earth 
resistance.
r  Electrode Dimensions
C onductors on X axis  
C onductors on Y ax is  
Length of C onductors (m)
Conductor D iam eter (m)
S pacing  (m)
Grid Area (m*2)
Grid Depth (m)
Earth R esistivity (Q.m )______ ____________
Chippings R esistivity (Q.m)
Chippings Depth (m)
Length of R ods (m)
Num ber of R ods ____________
Figure 6.2: Input Box for Grid Parameters for Analytical Calculation of Electrode Resistance.
connected to the grid, given by: K R = (6-4)
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6.3.2 Earth Chain Impedance of Lines
In the following box, the earth chain impedance of the lines connected to the grid is 
calculated using:
ZL =0.5Zg + {zgRr } ! (6.5)
Where: Zg is the earthwire impedance to ground per span (Q) and Rr is the footing
resistance (H). Figure 6.3 shows the dialogue window for the calculation of earth chain 
impedance of the overhead lines connected to the substation.
Earth C h ain  I m p e d a n c e  o f  L in e s  C o n n e c te d  to  Grid (Q)
E arthw ire Im p e d a n c e  
p e r  S p a n  (0)
Footing R esistance (0)
□  L ne 1
□  L ne 2
□  L ne 3
□  L ne 4
□  L ne 5
□  L ne 6
□  L ne 7
□  L ne 8
□  L ne 9
□  L ne 10
Total Chain Impedance (Q)
OK APPIV Cancel
Figure 6.3: Input and Calculation of Earth Chain Impedance of Lines Connected to the Grid.
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6.3.3 Impedance of Cable Sheath to Earth
The impedance of the cable sheath depends mainly on the length of the cable rather than 
the size of the cable or how deep it is buried [6.1]. Based on published analytical 
derivations, the impedance is given by:
For / < 60 J p  from 1 2  P  
0.851
For / > 60 J p  from Zc = OAp 0.55
(6.6)
(6.7)
Figure 6.4 shows the dialog box for the calculation of the impedance.
Earth Impedance of Cable Sheaths Connected to Grid
Length of Cable (m)
E  Cablel 
E  Cable2 
E  Cable3 
E  Cable4 
E C able5  
E  Cables 
E  Cable7 
E  Cable8 
E  Cable9 
E  CabielO
Soil Resistivity (Qm)
Total Cable Impedance (Q)
OK Apply Cancel
Figure 6.4: Input and Calculation of Earth Impedance of Cable Sheaths Connected to the Grid.
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6.4 C a lcu la tio n  o f  E P R  & P ro sp e c tiv e  S a fe ty  V o lta g es
Once the total impedance is calculated, then for a given fault current, the earth potential
rise can be calculated. The EPR is calculated as the product of the total impedance ZT
and the sum of all currents from overhead lines and cables according to the following 
Equation (6.8):
EPR = ZT {ILI (1 -  n ,)+  (1 -  )+  Icip, +.. } (6.8)
Where IL and Ic is the current induced in each overhead earthwire and cable sheath
respectively. Also, p x ...//„ are the coupling factors (typical value of 0.3) corresponding
to l i n e x. . l i n e n and are the coupling factors (given by Table 7 in BS: 7354 [6.1])
corresponding to c a b l e x. . . c a b l e n. The fault currents can be obtained from earth fault
current network studies performed by transmission companies. Figure 6.5 shows the 
dialog box for the calculation of EPR following this procedure.
Earth Fault Current Distribution in O verhead Lines & C ables 
(To be obtained from full earth fault current network studies)
CsUe OrrertDiaHiUfon-----------------------------------------------------
Fault Current Cable Coupling 
Infeed Factor
□  Cable 1
□  Cable 2
□  Cable 3
□  Cable 4
□  Cable 5
□  Cable 6
□  Cable 7
□  Cable 8
□  Cable 9
□  Cable 10
□  Line 1
Fault Current 
Infeed
M  r
Line Coupling 
Factor
r  i
□  Line 2 i i
□  Line 3 i i I l :
□  Line 4 I l l
□  Line 5
1  1 □
□  Line 6
□  Line 7 I 1
□  Line 8 1 1 I l
□  Line 9 l
□  Line 10 l, l
OK
C alculation  o f EPR
Apply Cancel
Figure 6.5: Input Box for Line and Cable Parameters for Earth Potential Rise Calculation.
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As seen in Section 3.3.2, equations for the calculation of touch and step voltage are:
VT =
ttRL I [d
\  0.5 /
+
y
1 1 1 -  0.5”“2 ^
+  +
2 h D + h D
>K.
pV
ttR L
1 1
+  ■
2 h D + h D
(6.9)
(6 .10)
Where V is the EPR, h is the grid depth, d  is the diameter of the conductors, L is the 
total length of the conductors and the rods, D is the spacing of the conductors and n the 
number of parallel conductors. The corrective factor Kt is given by:
=(0.15n + 0.7) (6.11)
Alternatively, the option to enter the grid current (Igr) for calculating the EPR is 
provided. Figure 6.6 shows the output window for the safety voltages.
□  Specify Value of Igr (A)
□  Calculate Igr to BS 7354 (A)
Prospective Safety Votages to BS 7354 
Earth Potential Rise (V) 
Calculated Touch Voltage (V) 
Calculated Step Voltage (V)
Figure 6.6: Output Window for Calculated Step and Touch Voltages
6.5 A c c id e n ta l  C ircu it
In Section 3.3.3, the accidental circuit specified in BS 7354 was presented. The body 
resistance is taken equal to 1000 Q and the footwear resistance is 4000 Q per shoe. In 
the developed program, the voltage dependence of the body impedance according to the 
IEC 60479-1 is also incorporated. The voltage dependent empirical equations of body 
impedance are given in Section 4.4.2. Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 6.7, 
alternative values can be used for shoe resistance or for any other additional resistance.
Input Parameters for Accidental Circuit
Bodykapedvice---------------------------------------------------
□  1000 O as in BS 7354 
0  According to IEC 479-1 5% of the porxiation
For Vt Scenario: 15% of the pop-**™
For Vs Scenario:
50% of the population
195% of the population
Footwear Resistance (Q)
E  Additional Resistance (O) I I
Contact Area Large-Default -J
Contact Conditions Dry-Default
Figure 6.7: Window for Input Parameters for Accidental Circuit.
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6.6 C a lcu la tio n  o f  T o lera b le  S a fe ty  V o lta g es
The following part of the developed program (see Figure 6.8), calculates the allowable 
step and touch voltages for a given fault duration and then compares the values with the 
generated step and touch voltages following injection of fault current into the grid to 
determine whether the system is safe or not, which forms the deterministic approach.
The allowable step and touch voltages are calculated using the threshold allowable 
current and body impedance as detailed in Sections 3.3.3 and 4.4.3 respectively. 
Therefore, the permissible voltages are:
For touch voltage equivalent circuit: Vt = /, ^ ——j  (6.12)
For step voltage equivalent circuit: Vs = /, + 2{RJw + Rc)} (6.13)
The allowable body current for any shock duration is deduced from IEC 60479-1 
time/current zones for 0%, 5% and 50% probability of ventricular fibrillation. Empirical 
equations for these curves were derived in this work and were given in Section 4.3. The 
calculation of safety voltages of a particular grid using the different levels of allowable 
body current, allows the user to compare easily the safety limits suggested in different 
standards. An option to account for the body impedance and the heart-current factors 
depending on the path that the current will take through the human body is also 
implemented. Details of these factors are described in Section 4.4.1. This allows the 
investigation of different scenarios of electrocution and the automatic determination of 
safety voltages, corresponding to each scenario.
TOLERABLE SAFETY VOLTAGES FOR DIFFERENT ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS
Boar CUTW« ThTMhOB
Fault C learance Time (s) 
Current deduced to m
| C t-S ate ty  Clave
Body Current Pfeh L et hand to both feet
□  U se Impedance Factor
□  U se Heart Factor
sxpvcxage 
Body Current P a th  
D  U se Impedance Factor 
□  Use Heart Factor
DETEHMMSTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT
Substation Touch Voltage is: 
Substation Step Voltage is:
"Help
; Allowable Touch V olage (V) j j Allowable Step Voltage (V) |
Allowable Body Current (A) | 1 Allowable Body Current (A ))
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
Figure 6.8: Calculation of Tolerable Safety Voltages and Deterministic Safety Assessment
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6.7 Probabilistic Risk Assessment
The probabilistic risk assessment in the developed program can be applied either for 
step or touch voltages. This interface uses the information for the system and accidental 
circuit that were entered in the previous steps and calculates initially the probability of 
ventricular fibrillation ( P vf) .  The probability P vf is calculated through the developed 
probability surface (Cardiff Probabilistic Model), described in Section 4.3, which allows 
accurate readings of the probability of VF. The same probability can also be calculated 
by the stepwise probability model, discussed in detail in Section 2.6.5, according to 
which the probability of VF can be either 0%, 5%, 50% or 100%.
The Probability of Presence (Ppr) is calculated by the number of working days per year 
and the individual exposure per day, while the Probability of EPR ( P epr)  is retrieved 
from historical system data. Finally, as shown in Figure 6.9, the individual risk is 
calculated, and depending on its value, it is ranked according to the ALARP criteria, as 
discussed in Section 2.7, to determine whether the risk is acceptable or not.
TIL IS TIC RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk Assessment E  Touch Vo*** □  stepVo«age
Calculate Probability of VF from: - 1
Probability of Ventricular Fibrillation:
Number of working days/year
Individual Exposure/day (s)
Probability of P resence:
.
Probability of EPR:
Individual Risk
. t tr* lOOO p e r  p e '! 3 P r f  »r /
I V
A ccep tab le
7
/I
. • m i ■•K'tr f N^TMII — Wf
¥
i per y
Figure 6.9: Probabilistic Risk Assessment Window. Application of Developed Cardiff Risk 
Assessment Facility of Transmission Systems (CRAFTS) to a Generic Typical Grid.
6.8.1 Grid Parameters and Safety Voltages
An example of the application of the software is now presented using the model grid of 
Figure 6.10 which is a 10x10 m square grid that consists of 100 meshes and is buried
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0.6 m under the ground surface. The diameter of the conductors is 0.1m and they are 
equally spaced every 10 m.
(50, 50, 0.6)
Figure 6.10: Layout o f Model Earth Grid.
The soil resistivity is assumed to be 100 Qm, and the surface is covered with a layer of 
chippings. The thickness of the layer is assumed 0.08 m and the chippings resistivity is 
taken as 300 Qm.
Using CRAFTS, the earth resistance of the grid was calculated to be 0.48 Q. For 
simplicity, no connected lines or cables were included. Therefore, the total impedance is 
calculated as 0.48 H. The grid current is assumed to be 30 kA, and the resulting EPR is 
found to be 14484 V. The worst case scenario for touch voltage at the comer of the grid 
is calculated to be 1961.9 V while the maximum step voltage is 1048 V.
The voltage dependency of the body impedance is taken into consideration, and it is 
calculated according to the statistical values corresponding to the 50% of the 
population. Hence, the body impedance is 870 Q and the footwear resistance is assumed 
to be 4000 Q  per foot. Figure 6.11 shows an overall screen display of the developed 
graphical user interface for CRAFTS. The input data described above together with the 
calculated parameters are shown.
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RISK ASSESSMENT AND SAFETY VOLTAGES FOR SUBSTATION EARTHING SYSTEMS
Electrode Dimensions
Conductors on X axis 
Conductors on Y axis 
Length of Conductors (m) 
Conductor Diameter (m) 
Spacing (m)
Grid Area (mA2)
Grid Depth (m)
Earth Resistivity (Q.m) 
Chippings Resistivity (G.m) 
Chippings Depth (m)
Length of Rods (m)
Number of Rods
11
11
2200
0.1
10
10000
0.6
100
300
0.08
0.2
100
Total Earthing Impedance
Earth Resistance of Grid (0)
0  Rg to BS 7354 0.482814
Earth Chain Impedance of Lines Connected to Grid (O) 
□  Equivalent Zl to BS 7354
Earth Impedance of Cable Sheath Connected to Grld(O)
□  Equivalent Zc to BS 7354
□  Alternative Value □  Alternative Zl Value □  Alternative Zc Value
Substation Earth Impedance (O) 0.482814
0  Specify Value of Igr (A)
□  Calculate Igr to BS 7354 (A)
30000
Prospective Safety Voltages to BS 7354 
Earth Potential Rise (V) 
Calculated Touch Voltage (V) 
Calculated Step Voltage (V)
14484.4
1961.9
1048.07
Input Parameters for Accidental Circuit
Body Impedance 
□  1000 G as in BS 7354
0  According to IEC 479-1 
For Vt Scenario:
For Vs Scenario:
50% of the population
5% of the population
95% of the population
Footwear Resistance (G) 4000
□  Additional Resistance (G)
Contact Area Large-Default
Contact Conditions Dry-Default
TOLERABLE SAFETY VOLTAGES FOR DIFFERENT ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS
Body Current Threshold
Fault Clearance Time (s) 
Current deduced from:
0.2
C1 - Safety Curve _ J  0.28796
Current Path Refinement (IEC 479-1) 
Body Current Path:
□ Help Typical Values
Left hand to both feet
□  Use Impedance Factor
□  Use Heart Factor
Allowable Touch Voltage (V) 956.054
Allowable Body Current (A) 0.287963
Step Voltage
Body Current Path:
□  Use Impedance Factor
□  Use Heart Factor
Allowable Step Voltage (V) 3071.81
Allowable Body Current (A) 0.287963
DETERMINISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT
Substation Touch Voltage is:
UNSAFE
Substation Step  Voltage is:
SAFE
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
Figure 6.11: Risk Assessment and Safety Voltages of a Model Grid.
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6.8.2 Safety A ssessm en t
For a shock duration of 200ms, according to Safety Curve (cx), the allowable touch and 
step voltages were calculated. Here, for the touch voltage, the allowable value for a 
current path is examined from left hand to both feet including the path factors for 
impedance and heart-current. The allowable touch and step voltages are 956 V and 
3071 respectively which infers that the system is safe from step voltages but not from 
touch voltages as indicated in Figure 6.11 .
In order to find out if the imposed risk is acceptable and the level of mitigation that may 
be required, a further probabilistic risk assessment was performed. The probability of 
ventricular fibrillation is calculated with the two methods and according to the Cardiff 
Probabilistic model, it is 9%, and the Stepwise Probability model gives 50%.
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT .  X
Risk A ssessm en t BTou v^ctage
Calculate Probability of VF from: Cardiff ProbaPfebc Model
Probability of Ventricular Fibrillation: 0JM
□  Step Votage
Z3
Error is 
0.0414619
Number of working days/year 
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Figure 6.12: Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
The probability of presence is estimated by setting as contact period with conductive 
parts 25 s per day for 200 day per year. The probability is then estimated tol.5 1 0 4. 
From historical data, the probability of rise of earth potential in a year period is 0.2. The 
Individual Risk is calculated to be 2.8-10^. As can be seen from Figure 6.12, the risk
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falls in the ALARP area which means that a cost benefits analysis will show whether it 
is worth applying mitigation measures to the assessed grid.
The interface is proved to be very useful in applying a sensitivity analysis of system 
parameters and accidental circuit. The probabilistic assessment gives an estimation not 
only of whether the system is safe or not but also how critical the safety is, which 
allows engineers and asset managers to make a more effective decision and cost benefit 
analysis.
6.9 Conclusions
A new risk assessment program with easy to use interface is developed. It uses BS 7354 
recommendations for the determination of safety voltages. Moreover, it allows user 
specified input for earth impedances and safety voltages, that may have been obtained 
through detailed numerical computation or measurement. The analysis of allowable 
body currents and voltages can be further enhanced with the latest international 
developments implemented in IEC standards.
The developed program named Cardiff Risk Assessment Facility for Transmission 
Systems (CRAFTS) uses a two-stage Assessment. First, a deterministic first stage and a 
probabilistic second stage. The second stage is optional and is useful if the first stage 
indicates hazardous voltages. Initial application of CRAFTS was encouraging and good 
feedback was received from industry. A fuller statistical and probabilistic analysis of the 
parameters governing safety of earthing system would allow a further refinement of the 
proposed method.
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CHAPTER 7. PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT OF 
ELECTRICAL SUBSTATIONS: A FULL ANALYSIS
7.1 Introduction
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) involves the quantification of various parameters 
of a hazard with the aim to evaluate numerical results upon the imposed risks. When a 
single “best guess” value is used as an estimate for the modelling of each of the 
contributing parameters, the process is described as single point or deterministic 
modelling.
Monte Carlo simulation takes into account the statistical variation and the probability 
distribution of the input parameters for the investigated system. It is a different 
approach o f probabilistic risk analysis, where a large number of possible scenarios is 
generated in order to account for a large number of values of the contributing 
parameters. The main advantage of Monte Carlo simulation is that it takes into account 
the weighting of each possible scenario by including the probability of its occurrence. 
Therefore, each variable within a simulation process is modelled by its associated 
distribution. The distribution characteristics may be based either on historical data of 
adequate size and quality or on expert analysis. For each distribution, the horizontal axis 
gives a range of possible values that the parameter could take while the vertical axis 
provides a probability weighting for each value within that range [7.1, 7.2].
As with a deterministic model, in a simulation model, the way the variables are 
structured and linked remains the same with the only difference that each of the 
contributing parameters is not represented by a single value but instead is described 
using a probability distribution [7.2]. This type of variable representation aims at 
calculating the combined impact of the variability in the model’s parameters. In this
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way, the result will be provided as a probability distribution showing the possible 
outcomes and their associated probability of occurrence.
7.2 Description of PRA Process in Earthing Systems
Chapter 4, was focussed on the probabilistic nature of the various parameters affecting 
the accidental circuit (e.g. body impedance, fibrillating current, etc), while Chapter 5 
investigated those variables that concern the system and its characteristics (e.g. fault 
current magnitude, clearance time, fault location).
The diagrams of Figures 7.1 and 7.2 provide an outline of the proposed probabilistic 
risk assessment for a transmission substation as it has been modelled using a platform 
simulation software, @Risk [7.3]. As can be seen, the first block concerns the earth 
fault current levels. The National Grid Seven Year Statement [7.4] provides tables with 
the maximum predicted fault current for each substation based on computer simulations 
of the system [7.5, 7.6]. However, as it was seen the fault current magnitude can vary 
significantly. For the risk assessment process different fault currents will be sampled 
during the simulation, from a uniform distribution shaped by predetermined maximum 
and minimum fault current values.
In the developed method, summarized in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 (flowcharts), fault current 
levels are used to compute the voltages appearing in and around a substation compound 
in case of an earth fault. CDEGS Software [7.7] was used to carry out the numerical 
computations. The earthing system geometry of a substation is modelled, and an earth 
fault current is injected for which the touch and step voltages are computed throughout 
the substation. Instead of assuming a worst case scenario that a person will be exposed 
to the maximum possible voltage, a person can be located anywhere in the substation 
and, therefore, he/she will be exposed to the voltage at the location.
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CDEGS software offers the option of extracting the results of the investigated profiles 
in Excel files which can then be integrated in the @Risk model to assess the Individual 
Risk. Moreover, the model makes use of the CDEGS facility along with the touch/step 
voltages to provide the exact coordinates in the substation where these voltages appear. 
For the investigation o f risk caused by touch voltages, it was assumed that throughout 
the substation, there is a possible touch voltage hazard scenario. The sampling of 
locations is made randomly within the substation and two meters outside the perimeter 
of the substation to include cases of contact with the fence. In addition, the model 
allows different visiting frequency for each area, which can be based on the local 
knowledge of the site. In this way, areas such as the gate, offices or pathways can be 
treated as busier than other locations at the substation. If an area is out of reach and 
presents no realistic hazard, then it could be ignored.
For each touch/step voltage scenario the corresponding body impedance is calculated. In 
Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, the body impedance was shown to be not only voltage 
dependent but also its magnitude varies for different body current path, and for shock 
durations longer than 0.1 s, the value of body impedance may decrease by about 10% to 
20% because of the skin rupture [7.8]. These factors, as can be seen in the diagram, are 
taken into consideration.
In order to calculate the magnitude of the body current, it is necessary to include any 
other resistances of the accidental circuit (See Section 4.5). The next block of the 
diagram concerns the calculation of the Probability of Ventricular Fibrillation for a 
given scenario. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, safety criteria based on IEC 60479-1 criteria 
[7.8] were further processed to develop a probability surface for ventricular fibrillation 
which allows determination of the probability of VF for any given scenario of body 
current, specific current path and shock duration. The shock duration is sampled from a
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distribution which was generated using the historical fault clearance records of a ten 
year period as it was described in Section 5.2.
As far as the Probability o f Presence is concerned, the site locations, scheduled work 
activities and the presence of people in the hazardous area, control the time during 
which a person will be in contact with conductive parts in the substation within a year. 
The Probability o f Presence is calculated over a year’s time. For the calculation of the 
Probability o f EPR, the fault frequency of a substation can be site specific based on the 
complexity of the system as shown in Section 5.4. Once the Probability of VF is 
calculated, the Individual Risk is obtained from the product of the three probabilities; 
Presence (P p r ) ,  EPR ( P e p r )  and VF ( P v f ) .
7.3 Case Study of Probabilistic Risk Assessment
The purpose of this study is, on the one hand, to explore further all the probabilistic 
parameters o f the process making use of the available data provided from the 
transmission company and, on the other hand, to identify the studies that need to be 
conducted or the data that need to be recorded for the future support of risk assessment 
processes.
The quantitative risk assessment method proposed in the previous section is applied 
here to a real case study of a 400/275 kV substation located in South Wales. The site of 
the Cilfynydd substation has been used for various experiments and measurements 
conducted by the High Voltage Energy Systems Group (HIVES) of Cardiff University, 
therefore, data concerning the earthing system design and circuit specifications are 
readily available. Some parameters which were necessary for the modelling of the 
system were derived from previous risk assessment reports [7.9, 7.10].
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The studies earned out in this work include both analytical calculations according to 
British standards and numerical simulations of the substation earthing system under 
fault conditions.
7.3.1 CDEGS Simulation
The model shown in Figure 7.3, represents the original earthing system of the substation 
and the fence is also included in order to investigate shock scenarios of fence touch 
voltage.
Figure 7 3 : Simulated System Layout for Cilfynydd Substation.
The touch profiles were set to two meters from each other in order to avoid extremely 
large result files. On the other hand, the points of each profile were set to every meter so 
that a detailed enough analysis o f touch/step voltages could be obtained across the 
substation. The results are presented in Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 showing areas where 
the touch voltage can be as high as 50% of the EPR. As can be seen, the highest
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potential difference appears at the comers of the meshes. As expected, step voltages are 
much lower than touch voltage ranging between 1.3% and 13% of the EPR.
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7.3.2 Risk A ssessm en t Results
7.3.2.1 Touch Voltage Risk
In accordance with the steps of the simulation process as shown in the diagrams of 
Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2, all input parameters as well as the results of the Cilfynydd 
substation risk assessment are detailed in this section.
(i) Grid Current
Table D.3.1 of the NG Seven Year Statement [7.4] provides the short circuit current 
forecasts for the Cilfynydd substation where the single phase initial peak current value 
is given at 61.71 kA. This is the maximum value obtained for the worst case scenario 
but under favourable conditions, it can be reduced down to 50%, giving a minimum of 
30.85 kA. The maximum rms value is calculated to be 43.63 kA while the minimum is 
21.81 kA. Also, from Table 5.2 of Chapter 5 [7.11], it is estimated that the grid current 
( /^ )  is a percentage of the return current ( /r) where for Cilfynydd it is 69.2%.
Therefore, the maximum grid current is 30.1 kA and the minimum is 15.05 kA. The 
histogram of Figure 7.6 represents the values that were sampled with the Monte Carlo 
simulation process.
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Figure 7.6: Sampled Values of Fault Current.
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(ii) Touch Voltages
Since for every iteration and associated grid current (7^), the touch voltage is
determined, the magnitudes of these voltages, not only depend on the grid current but 
also on the exact location within the substation.
By randomly sampling different locations of presence throughout the substation and for 
different possible fault currents, a distribution of touch voltage magnitudes ranging 
from 5V to 12854 V was calculated and reported in Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: Sampled Values of Touch Voltages.
(iii) Body Impedance
As shown in Figure 7.1, the proposed approach takes into consideration the voltage 
dependency of the body impedance as well as the path taken by the current as it travels 
through the human body.
When a person is exposed to a hazardous voltage, a current travels through the body and 
heart. If the current magnitude and shock duration are high enough, the person will 
suffer from ventricular fibrillation which is the primary cause of death during 
electrocution. The magnitude of the body current depends on the accidental circuit
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whose main parameters are the body resistance, the contact resistance, footwear 
resistance and any other additional resistances (gloves, etc.) In this study, BS 7354 was 
adopted for which RF = 4000 Q. per foot, but no chippings were considered.
For the body resistance, BS 7354 specifies a single value of 1000 H. On the other hand, 
IEC 60479-1 suggests that the body impedance is voltage dependent and, therefore, 
provides curves of body resistance against the applied voltage. In Section 3.7.6, it was 
shown that a relatively small change in body impedance can affect the allowable grid 
current.
The IEC curves corresponding to 5%, 50% and 95% of the population were digitized 
and fitted to empirical equations. The calculated body impedances, based on the 
voltage-dependent model, are shown in the histogram of Figure 7.8 for a number of 
electrocution scenarios. As can be seen, the magnitude of body impedance ranges from 
237 to 6354 Q depending on the touch voltage, the selected current path and the 
shock duration sampled in each iteration. Then, the contact resistance and any other 
additional resistances are added (shoes, gloves) in order to find the total accidental 
impedance and calculate the resulting body current (see Figure 7.9).
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Figure 7.8: Calculated Body Impedances for Touch Voltage Scenarios.
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Figure 7.9: Calculated Total Impedance for Touch Voltage Scenarios.
The three different parts of the histogram from left to right correspond to current paths, 
(a) hand to hand (no shoe resistance included), (b) hand to both feet and (c) hand to 
foot.
( iv )  Body Current
Once the accidental impedance is calculated, the magnitude current that will travel 
through the human body is calculated for any given touch voltage. Figure 7.10 shows 
the currents that were calculated for the different electrocution scenarios. As can be 
seen, for 95% of the scenarios, the current magnitude is between 0 and 5.27 A, while 
there are a few extreme cases where the current is as high as 27 A.
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Figure 7.10: Calculated Body Currents for Touch Voltage Scenarios.
(v) Clearance Times
The measured fault clearance times provided by National Grid were fitted using a 
Gamma Distribution. During the simulation, the distribution was used to include 
scenarios with various combinations of applied voltage and shock duration. Figure 7.11 
shows the sampled clearance times used for the 50000 iterations of the study. The 
minimum sampled clearance time is 31ms and the maximum is 247 ms, while the mean 
value of clearance time is 82 ms.
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Figure 7.11: Sampled Fault Clearance Times.
(vi) Probability of Ventricular Fibrillation
Making use of the probability surface of ventricular fibrillation developed in this work 
(Section 4.3), for every combination of body current and shock duration, the 
corresponding probability of fibrillation is calculated taking also into consideration the 
body current path, (Figure 7.12).
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Figure 7.12: Calculated Probability of Ventricular Fibrillation for Touch Voltage Scenarios.
7-14
The histogram of Figure 7.12 shows that almost half of the random electrocution 
scenarios have a maximum 10% Probability of VF. Moreover, another 10% of scenarios 
have a probability o f VF higher than 97%. The overall probability of VF is found to be 
23%.
(vii) Individual Risk
In order to find the Individual Risk, the probability of VF is multiplied by the 
probability of EPR and the probability of Presence. As described in Section 5.4, 
Equation (5.1) gives the failure rate for the specific substation as a function of the 
connected lines and cables as well as the number of bays.
Cilfynydd substation has 11 switchgear bays, and 4 double circuit lines are connected to 
the substation but there are no underground cables routes. According to Equation 5.1, 
the fault rate is 0.475 faults/ year i.e. one fault every couple of years is expected. 
However, only 25% to 50% of the faults result in significant fault current and rise of 
earth potential [7.10]. Assuming the worst case, the Probability of EPR in a year period 
for the Cilfynydd substation is estimated to 0.2375 or 24%.
Moreover, a typical estimate of exposure to touch voltages of a person working at a 
substation can be 25 seconds for 200 days per year. This gives a probability of Presence 
of 15 • 10"5. The product of the three probabilities is given in Figure 7.13 .
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Figure 7.13: Calculated Individual Risk for Touch Voltage Scenarios.
The Individual Risk is estimated to be 8.93 -10-6 and is compared against the HSE 
criteria introduced in Section 2.7. The risk falls within the ALARP region which means 
that although the risk is controlled, further mitigation is advisable. Usually, a cost 
benefit analysis will follow to determine the level of expenditure necessary to have a 
sufficient impact on the reduction of risk.
13.2.2 Step Voltage Risk
Similarly, the risk from the step voltages that a person maybe exposed in case of a fault 
is also assessed. As seen in CDEGS simulation results, shown in Figure 7.5, the step 
voltages is not higher than 13% of the EPR. However, it is important to note that the 
step voltage profiles were calculated using as reference the worst EPR of the system and 
therefore, overestimating their magnitude.
As with the touch voltage study, different fault currents and locations within the 
substation were included during the simulation to produce possible step voltage 
electrocution scenarios. Figure 7.14 shows these values of step voltages.
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The step voltages as expected are of low magnitude, and 50% of the values are less than 
50V. Although there are a few values reaching 2.6 kV, the mean value is 118 V, and 
only 5% of the values are higher than 460 V. It is then expected, that only a small 
percentage of these scenarios would result in ventricular fibrillation.
Figure 7.15 shows the probabilities of VF for step voltage scenarios. In 83% of the 
cases, the probability of VF is less than 2%. As can be seen from the figure, for 5% of 
the scenarios, there is more than 84% probability of VF.
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Figure 7.15: Calculated Probabilities of Ventricular Fibrillation for Step Voltage Scenarios.
The mean value of the probability of VF is close to 1% and is much lower than the 33% 
calculated for the case of touch voltages. However, the probability of someone getting 
exposed to step voltage hazards is much higher. A person working in a substation is 
expected to be exposed to step voltage risk for 200 days per year for 8 hours a day. For 
the same Probability of EPR, the Individual Risk is shown in Figure 7.16.
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Figure 7.16: Calculated Individual Risk for Step Voltage Scenarios.
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In this case, the total probability is 0.0034 which is almost in the unacceptable area of 
the HSE criteria and mitigation is necessary to reduce the risks regardless of the costs. 
The interesting thing to notice is that although the step voltages are considerably lower 
than the touch voltages, the risk imposed by step voltages is much higher because of the 
increased Probability of Presence.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, a novel approach to probabilistic risk assessment of electrical 
substations is proposed, based on the developed criteria that take into consideration the 
probabilistic nature of all the contributing parameters. The key points of the process are:
• The integration in the process o f the probability surface of ventricular fibrillation 
for accurate readings of the probability of VF.
• The voltage and time and time dependency of body impedance.
•  The use of historical data for the simulation of various system parameters such 
as fault clearance time and fault current.
•  The integration of computed touch and step profiles in the substation acquired 
from the simulation of the substation earthing system using CDEGS.
• The random exposure of a person to different touch and step voltages depending 
on his/her location inside and outside the substation.
• The use of historical data for the calculation of the probability of EPR.
The approach is applied to a large substation investigating both touch and step voltage 
profiles. The individual risk is calculated for both cases and it is shown that step 
voltages imposed higher risks due to the higher probability of presence in case of a 
fault.
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CHAPTER 8. GENERAL DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS 
AND FUTURE WORK
In this investigation, existing risk assessment practices for power systems earthing 
systems have been examined closely. A number of key parameters have been studied in 
detail which lead to the development o f a new approach of probabilistic risk assessment. 
The new proposed method incorporates the recommendations of applicable standards 
and uses historical fault data for the location and better estimate clearance time of the 
faults. The new method is further developed and computerised in the form of a software 
routine to be used by practising engineers.
The extensive literature review carried out primarily aimed at describing the legal 
framework required for conducting the risk assessment process in order to comprehend 
its main principles as well as the targets that need to be achieved. It was shown that 
probabilistic risk assessment is a tool that makes full use of the available data, scientific 
information and experts’ analysis in order to understand the nature and degree of risk 
imposed to the employees and public during an operation.
Based on the latest findings of investigations on the effect of current on the human body 
and on the accidental circuit as well as on the recorded data of electricity networks 
faults, a process that represents closely the real life conditions, minimises assumptions 
and provides sound risk assessments can be developed. Over the past few years the 
electrical industry worldwide has started recognising the probabilistic nature of the 
exposure to rise of earth potential and of the effect of current on the human body.
An extensive review of the suggested processes revealed a range of different 
approaches, some of which have been recently adopted by various transmission and 
distribution companies worldwide.
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Either because of the lack of historical data to support the various assumptions made or 
the complexity of the process, probabilistic risk assessment so far has not gained 
enough confidence, and it is usually employed as a second stage assessment after the 
use of deterministic criteria implemented in the various standards around the world.
An appraisal of existing standards has shown that due to different assumptions used for 
calculating the various parameters o f a given earthing grid, there are substantial 
differences between the recommended values of tolerable voltages and, consequently, 
reinforced the concept of safety limits that are applicable for an earth grid. Significant 
differences in the safety limit-curves were obtained with different applicable standards. 
The differences were attributed to a combination of factors: (i) difference in assumed 
tolerable body current; (ii) differences in the parameters of the electrocution circuit; (iii) 
differences in the predicted touch voltage; and (iv) differences in the assumed worst- 
case shock location. The initial studies carried out by previous members of the research 
group were limited to considering a generic 100x100m earth grid and only the lOOQm 
and lOOOQm earth resistivity cases. In this work, this approach was further extended 
and developed into a fully computerised process for the determination of the safety- 
limits for grids of different size and design in terms of the maximum allowable fault 
current for a given fault duration. The computations allow the construction of safety- 
limit surfaces, which are the threshold surfaces of maximum permissible fault current 
magnitude and duration, for the earthing parameter under consideration.
The three representative standards, IEEE 80, BS 7354 and EA-TS 41-24, were 
considered in this work for a parametric study of the effects of earth resistivity, grid area 
and mesh density on the maximum allowable fault current for a given fault duration. A 
wide range of generic grid designs and earth resistivities have been considered and it 
was demonstrated that:
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• Large variations exist between the safety limit-surfaces determined by the 
different standards.
• Differences found in these comparative studies are attributed mainly to the 
assumed probability of ventricular fibrillation, shock location and electrocution 
circuit.
• More extensive overlapping of the safety limits was predicted from different 
standards than was shown by the initial work through a more comprehensive 
parametric study of earthing system parameters.
• Safety limit-curves and surfaces could be useful in identifying whether a given 
standard may have safety and/or cost implications compared with the alternative 
standards.
• Harmonisation of earthing systems design standards require the inclusion of 
probabilistic parameters, and may lead to a less subjective approach to design.
As a result, the industry is looking for a more rigorous and comprehensive procedure of 
probabilistic risk assessment of the earthing systems. In order to achieve this, a detailed 
analysis of all parameters was undertaken using the accidental circuit and historical fault 
data provided from the collaborating transmission companies. These parameters were 
modelled and integrated into the proposed probabilistic risk assessment process.
Work within this investigation on improving accuracy of calculation of heart fibrillation 
has led to the development of a probability surface of ventricular fibrillation and a 
computerised process that determines an accurate probability for a given body current 
and shock duration. This procedure takes into consideration the body current path and 
eliminates reading errors or assumptions that could result into conservative or optimistic 
conclusions.
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A model for the body impedance was also developed to include dependence of 
impedance upon voltage and time as well as accounting for the path that the current 
travels through the body. The resulting accidental circuit includes various additional 
resistances such as footwear and contact resistance giving an improved model which is 
as close as possible to real life conditions.
The proposed risk assessment methodology aims to take account of the contributions 
due to the probabilistic nature of the load, protection system and grid characteristics. In 
this work, fault data was obtained from the collaborating company for a period of 10 
years (1993-2003). The extensive analysis revealed that the mean clearance time is 80 
ms, which is much lower than the currently adopted 200 ms. Moreover, such mean is 
variable with substation location and type of circuit breaker installed. A further 
important finding is the frequency of faults at given locations. It was demonstrated that 
some coastal/industrial site have a much higher fault frequency compared with in land 
substations. The clearance time and fault frequency are two major factors that can affect 
the risk in a significant way.
Another observation made from the supplied fault data relates to the cause of the fault. 
Over 80% of the faults were caused by lightning and severe weather conditions, and 
take place mainly on overhead lines. Current working practice on substations and 
towers requires no lightning risk and a low humidity which reduces the risk of exposure 
significantly. Such information is not considered in the existing practice of risk 
assessment and yet its benefits are enormous for the companies.
The current practice o f risk assessment used by the transmission companies uses the 
maximum possible fault current in order to calculate the generated touch and step 
voltages. Studies in this investigation have shown that only a very small percentage of 
faults would result in maximum fault current and, consequently, in maximum touch and
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step voltages. Since 81% of faults occur on overhead transmission lines due to lightning 
or severe weather conditions, a double circuit line was modelled, and faults at different 
points on the transmission lines were simulated in order to investigate the resulting fault 
currents. It was found that depending on the length of the line and fault location, the 
fault current could range from 25% to 41% of its possible maximum value. Moreover, 
by the assumption that the maximum fault current would occur under maximum load 
conditions, the fault occurrence was investigated using the system fault data, and it was 
found that only 16% of faults could have occurred under maximum load conditions. It is 
noted that the load values used are the maximum values of each month, while the real 
load conditions vary during the day and month between minimum and maximum 
values. On this basis, it is estimated that only a small percentage of the recorded faults 
could have actually caused a maximum fault current.
The above fundamental investigations on parameters affecting the risk were 
implemented in a new computerised risk assessment procedure CRAFTS suitable for 
transmission systems. CRAFTS allows a full probabilistic risk assessment of the system 
under investigation. The application integrates the recent developments in the latest 
standard IEC 60479-1 and the developed probability surface of ventricular fibrillation. 
A case study performed on a typical grid has shown that the developed program is very 
useful when applying sensitivity analysis of the various parameters of the system and 
accidental circuit. It allows a direct visualisation of the effects of these parameters on 
the magnitude of risk. Furthermore, it estimates the level of risk more accurately 
indicating how critical the situation is, and consequently, allowing for a more effective 
decision making and cost benefit analysis.
The different parameters that affect the estimation of the individual risk in the proposed 
probabilistic risk assessment methodology were included in the process.
8-5
It is worth mentioning that the process incorporates the earthing system simulation 
results performed by specialised software, namely CDEGS. For the case study, the 
earthing system o f an operating 275kV /400kV substation is modelled and an earth fault 
current is simulated in order to calculate the touch and step voltages throughout the 
substation. Instead of assuming a worst case scenario that a person will be exposed to 
the maximum possible voltage, it is considered that a person can be anywhere in the 
substation and, therefore, he/she will be exposed to the voltage at the point of exposure. 
For a sufficient number of possible scenarios, the total Probability of VF is calculated 
for both touch and step voltages. The case study demonstrated that although step 
voltages were of smaller magnitude than touch voltages and only a small percentage of 
the simulated scenarios would result in death, they imposed higher risk due the higher 
exposure of employees.
8.1 Future Work
Areas that this work could be extended to include:
•  Further studies on the fault current for the development of algorithms that can 
describe statistically its magnitude according to load conditions and fault 
location and their integration on the proposed methodology.
• Investigation of employees’ whereabouts in the substation and working habits in 
order to withdraw safer conclusions on the period of time that they remain in 
contact with conductive parts and are exposed to hazardous voltages.
Extension of the user’s interface to perform the Monte Carlo simulation process as 
described in Chapter 7.
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Figure A: Lighting flash density to ground per square kilometre per year for the British Isles [5.5].
APPENDIX B
Fault Location 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00
Overhead line & Cable
400 kV 122 123 93
275 kV 49 20 33
132 kV 3 2 6
Other 2 0 0
Transformer & Reactor Circuits
400 kV 9 6 2
275 kV 13 7 9
132 kV 3 1 7
Other 3 1 0
Busbars
400 kV 4 1 0
275 kV 0 2 2
132 kV 3 0 1
Other 0 0 0
Other Plant
400 kV 1 0 4
275 kV 3 4 1
132 kV 5 5 7
Other 0 0 0
Unknown or external to National Grid 1 6 0
Figure B: Fault Location for the three year period 1997 to 2000 [5.8J.
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